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ABSTRACT
Essays on Information Economics
Gowtham Tangirala
In this doctoral dissertation, I broadly study the impact of information on economies
from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Specifically, I study how strate-
gic agents in a heterogeneous interacting network make decisions under incomplete
information and how their actions are affected by the parameters that define the in-
completeness of the information, with an emphasis on the social value of information.
I then estimate the impact of information disclosure on the stock market by studying
the specific example of the annual CCAR and DFAST bank stress tests conducted
by the Federal Reserve. This dissertation consists of two chapters.
In the first chapter, I study a game of heterogeneous strategic interactions under
incomplete information. I characterize the equilibrium actions and compare them
to the benchmark constrained-efficient allocation. I parameterize the available infor-
mation in terms of pairwise information commonality and accuracy and study how
changing the said commonality and accuracy affects the social welfare. I also study
how the structure of interactions between players affects the social value of informa-
tion. I find that the extent of the inefficiency of the economy dictates the social value
of information. I provide a complete characterization of the comparative statics of
the social welfare with respect to commonality and accuracy for completely efficient
economies. I find that when interactions are heterogenous, it is possible for social
welfare to be non-monotonic with respect to information commonality, a behavior un-
seen in economies with homogeneous interactions. For inefficient economies, I provide
sufficient conditions under which the social welfare exhibits monotonic behavior.
In the second chapter, I study the predictability of the results of the annual
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and Dodd-Frank Act Stress
Test (DFAST) conducted by the Federal Reserve. I find that these results are highly
predictable on year-to-year basis. I also find a high degree of predictability within
the adverse scenario and the severely adverse scenario results within a given year. I
find that that these predictable trends hold over time, from 2012 to 2020. I also try
to ascertain the impact of the announcement of these results on the stock market
and find no statistically significant effect. Lastly, I study the fixed effect impact of
the disclosure events on the stock and options market. I find that while there are
individual instances of significant impact, there is no significant impact across the
years. I discuss potential implications of these patterns for the further development
and application of stress testing.
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Introduction
It is by now conventional wisdom that public communications and announcements are
among the key instruments in policymakers’ toolbox. They are used by Central Banks
around the world as an instrument for the conduct of monetary policy. The most
notable example is ECB President Mario Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes” speech
in 2012 (Randow and Speciale [50]), which resulted in a reduction in the bond yield
spreads and borrowing costs of distressed economies in the eurozone (Wanke [54]).
More recently, in 2019, the Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell stated that the
Federal Reserve is “conducting a public review of [its] monetary policy strategy, tools,
and communications.” (emphasis added) and that “we are looking at how we might
improve the communication of our policy framework.” (Powell [38]).
The importance of such public announcements, however, is not limited to central
bankers or even policymakers. Many firms understand that their earnings announce-
ments can have a significant effect on their stock prices. In fact, as documented by
Johnson et al. [40], firms typically manage public expectations before their earnings
announcements. For example, in Q2 2016, the investor-relations department at Citi-
group referred Wall Street analysts to “comments made by Chief Executive Michael
Corbat at a June 2nd investor conference . . . [that] the bank’s second quarter profits
were likely to be ‘roughly flat’ compared with the first quarter when Citigroup earned
$1.10 a share.” (Gryta et al. [32]). On July 15th 2016, Citigroup’s shares rose by 2%
despite a 14% decline in year-over-year earnings because reported earnings per share
was $1.24, greater than the market forecast of $1.10 (Johnson et al. [40]).
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These examples highlight the importance of public announcements for economic
outcomes. The fact that such announcements are public is in fact central to their
ability to shape expectations and impact market outcomes. Public announcements
affect the market by not only providing new information but also common information
to the market.
In this thesis, I explore the role of public information in two contexts – one
theoretical and one empirical. First, I study how public information affects social
welfare in the presence of heterogeneous coordination motives. Second, I study the
annual DFAST and CCAR bank stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve and
assess the impact of the disclosure of their results on the stock market.
In chapter one, I present a theoretical model to study the social value of infor-
mation in the presence of heterogeneous interactions among strategic agents under
incomplete information. When agents coordinate under incomplete information, they
are subject to information frictions that prevent them from coordinating efficiently.
There are two kinds of information frictions that could potentially arise – incomplete-
ness frictions and heterogeneity frictions. Incompleteness frictions arise due to the
fact that players do not know the true state of the economy accurately. Heterogeneity
frictions arise when agents have different sources of (incomplete) information. Note
that in an economy that is subject to incompleteness frictions but not heterogeneity
frictions, agents can still arrive at a consensus about the state of the world, albeit
an inaccurate one. Adding heterogeneity frictions further weakens the agents’ ability
to coordinate. In such a scenario, any public information will be used by agents to
form higher-order expectations, leading to imperfect coordination. As such, notions
of commonality and accuracy of information become important in determining the
equilibrium outcomes in the economy. The commonality of information addresses
the ability of agents to arrive at a consensus and the accuracy of the information
addresses the discrepancy between the achieved consensus and the true state of the
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economy. I lay out these notions explicitly in chapter one.
I explore the questions of coordination and social value of information using a
framework in which a finite group of decision makers interact with one another in
the presence of strategic interactions that are potentially asymmetric both in degree
and nature. Specifically, I focus on the class of standard quadratic-payoff games,
while allowing for an arbitrary pattern of strategic complementarities and/or substi-
tutabilities between pairs of agents. I explicitly characterize the equilibrium actions
and compare them to the benchmark of the constrained-efficient allocation. The
constrained-efficient allocation may differ from the equilbrium actions because the
social planner accounts for the direct payoff externalities between players that play-
ers do not account for in equilibrium.
The presence of information frictions within the economy leads to social welfare
losses, which depend on the structure and nature of interactions between the players.
The social value of information depends on the extent of the inefficiency of the equi-
librium. Indeed, in chapter one, I provide a complete characterization of the behavior
of the social welfare in efficient economies with respect to the underlying common-
ality and accuracy of the information structure. When all players’ interactions are
complementary, increasing information commonality necessarily increases the social
welfare. However, when there are substitutive interactions within the economy, be-
cause even-numbered higher-order interactions are complementary, it can potentially
result in a net complementary effect. Indeed, I find that when payoff interactions
between agents are heterogeneous, social welfare can potentially be non-monotonic
in the commonality in agents’ information sets. This happens only when payoff in-
teractions are heterogeneous. I conclude by studying the social value of information
in inefficient economies and provide sufficient conditions for monotonic behavior of
social welfare with respect to information commonality and accuracy.
In chapter two, I try to quantify the impact of the announcement of the annual
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stress tests, conducted by the Fed, on the stock market. In the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve started conducting regulatory stress tests
on big banks to determine their capital levels as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. It started in 2009 with the Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (SCAP). As part of the SCAP, the loan portfolios of qualifying
banks were subjected to a hypothetical stress scenario and the resulting losses and loss
rates were made public. Over the years, the SCAP evolved into the Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST).
As part of the DFAST, the Fed released loss values and rates of loan portfolios
for qualifying banks under two separate scenarios – the adverse scenario and the
severely adverse scenario. I study the predictability of these reported loss values and
loss rates. I find that both losses and loss rates are highly predictable within the
two scenarios reported, both across banks and across loan categories. This is very
surprising because the defined scenarios are roughly 250-dimensional objects, yet the
predictability between the severely adverse and the adverse results effectively reduces
the stress severity to one dimension and suggests a missed opportunity to diversify
the types of stresses tested. I also evaluate the predictability of these reported losses
and loss rates across time. Once again, I find that losses reported the previous year
are very highly predictive of the losses reported in the current year across all banks
and loan categories. This calls into question the usefulness and the informativeness
of these results. In order to study whether the stress tests provide new information
to the stock market, I perform a regression to see if there is a tangible correlation
between the announced loss rates and the unexpected return of the respective bank on
the day after the announcement. I find that there is statistically significant correlation
between the two. I also repeat this exercise with the unexpected loss rate (computed
from the two previous years’ worth data) and the unexpected return for the bank
on the day after the announcement. Once again, I find no statistically significant
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correlation between the two. This is consistent with the finding above that the
announced stress test results are very predictable.
Finally, I evaluate the fixed effect impact of the announcement itself as an event on
the stock and option market. I find significant effects in some years, but no significant
effects when data is pooled across years, suggesting that there is no overall effect of the
announcement. The presence of statistically significant effects is somewhat surprising
because the date of the announcement of the stress results is known well in advance.
This suggests that the activity on the day of the announcement is driven mostly by
speculation.
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Chapter 1
Network Interactions and the Social Value of Information
1.1 Introduction
Many economic interactions feature coordination and miscoordination motives in the
form strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. Consider, for example, the
classical example of bank runs discussed in Diamond and Dybvig [27]: if a depositor
believes that other depositors will likely run on the bank that they have commonly
invested in, she has stronger incentives to run on the bank herself. Depositors’ actions
in such a scenario—whether to run or not—are strategic complements. Similarly, in
a market where various producers compete a la Cournot, if a producer believes that
its competitors would increase production, she has an incentive to decrease her own
output. In this case, producers’ actions are strategic substitutes.
As is evident from the above examples, an agent’s optimal actions in an envi-
ronment that exhibits such strategic interactions are highly dependent not only on
her expectations of the economy’s underlying fundamentals—say, the solvency of the
bank in the first example or consumer demand in the second—but also on her expec-
tations of the decisions of other agents’ actions. As a result, any uncertainty about
the fundamental and/or expectations of other agents can play a first-order role in
determining economic outcomes.1
1This insight has a long history, going back to Keynes [43], who famously described investments
in the stock market to a fictional beauty contest game in which participants are supposed to choose
six prettiest pictures out of a hundred from a newspaper. Those who choose the most popular
pictures will be given a reward. Explaining the reasoning behind the choice made by a rational
participant, Keynes writes: “It is not a case of choosing those that, to the best of one’s judgment,
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In this chapter, I study how information frictions surrounding the state of the
economy affect the social value of information, specifically in the presence of hetero-
geneous strategic interactions. I generalize the framework of Angeletos and Pavan
(2007) [17] and characterize how heterogeneity in the nature and extent of strategic
interactions shape the behavior of individual agents within the economy and deter-
mine the private and social values of information. My results indicate that benchmark
homogeneous-interactions models such as Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17] may mask
key insights on how strategic complementarities and substitutabilities shape the social
value of information.
I explore these questions using a framework in which a finite group of decision
makers interact with one another in the presence of strategic interactions that are
potentially asymmetric both in degree and nature. Specifically, I focus on the class of
standard quadratic-payoff games, while allowing for an arbitrary pattern of comple-
mentarities and/or substitutabilities between pairs of agents. As is standard in the
literature, I capture these asymmetric patterns of interactions by a directed, weighted
network, which I refer to as the economy’s interaction network. While reduced-form,
this framework is general enough to nest various types of economic interactions, such
as peer effects Ballester et al. [18], competition between firms that interact with one
another in various, potentially overlapping markets Myatt and Wallace (2015) [47],
and price-setting behavior in production networks La’O and Tahbaz-Salehi [45].
To study the private and social values of information, I endow the above-mentioned
framework with incomplete information. More specifically, I assume that agents’
payoffs are affected by an unknown state—what I refer to as the economy’s funda-
mental—and that each agent receives a private signal that is potentially informative
are really the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have
reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion
expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and
higher degrees.”
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about both the fundamental and other agents’ signals. Thus, an agent’s signal not
only helps her form an imperfect estimate for the economy’s underlying state, but
also informs her about the signals of all the other agents, which in turn allows her to
form expectations about their equilibrium actions. To capture the dual role of signals
in my framework, I parameterize the economy’s information structure using two sets
of parameters. A first set of parameters, which I refer to signals’ accuracies, capture
the correlation of each agent’s signal with the fundamental. The second set of param-
eters, which I refer to as signals’ commonalities, represent the pairwise correlations
between agents’ signals.
Before describing the results, I note that this simple framework exhibits two dis-
tinct types of information frictions: (i) information frictions that arise due to incom-
pleteness of information about the fundamental (as measured by signals’ accuracies),
and (ii) information frictions that arise due to heterogeneity of information and im-
perfect correlations between agents’ signals (as measured by signals’ commonalities).
The former friction prevents agents from precisely estimating the value of the un-
derlying fundamental, whereas the latter friction prevents them from arriving at a
consensus estimate for it. Notably, both types of information frictions can result in
welfare losses. My results focus on the interplay between the two welfare losses and
study how changing the information structure in terms of the underlying accuracy
and commonality affects the social welfare.
I start the analysis in Section 1.3 by characterizing the equilibrium and (con-
strained) efficient outcomes in terms of model primitives—namely, the economy’s
interaction network and the accuracy and commonality of agents’ signals. As in
Bergemann et al. [19], I find that equilibrium actions depend on the Hadamard
product of the economy’s interaction matrix and the matrix of pairwise signal com-
monalities. This characterization captures the fact that the extent to which a pair
of agents try to coordinate with one another in equilibrium depends not only on the
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intensity of their interactions but also on the extent to which their signals are in-
formative about each other’s signals. I also obtain a similar characterization for the
constrained-efficient outcome.
With these preliminary results in hand, I then characterize whether agents over-
or under-react to their private signals in equilibrium (compared to the constrained
efficient benchmark). Not surprisingly, I find that the extent of agents’ over- and
under-reaction to their private signals depends not only on the detailed nature of the
economy’s interaction network, but also on the underlying information structure. In
particular, I find that it is possible for players with a fixed set of payoffs to over- and
under-react in equilibrium (again, as benchmarked against the constrained-efficient
solution) depending on the economy’s information structure. Importantly, such a
phenomenon is absent in economies with symmetric coordination motives, such as
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17], who show that whether agents over- or under-react
to their private signals only depends on the economy’s payoff structure.
I then turn to the study of the social value of information as a function of the
economy’s information structure. Specifically, I provide a series of comparative static
results for equilibrium welfare in terms of changes in signals’ commonalities and
accuracies. As my first main result, I find that if the economy is efficient under all
information structures, social welfare is always increasing in signals’ accuracy. This
result follows from two observations. First, all else equal, more accurate signals enable
agents to better match their actions with the underlying fundamental, thus reducing
the friction due to imperfect signals. Second, when the economy is efficient under
all information structures, the private value of information coincides with the social
value of information, and hence more accuracy translates into higher equilibrium
social welfare.
The comparative statics of welfare with respect to signal commonalities is less
straightforward, even when the economy is efficient under all information structures.
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I find that social welfare is increasing in signal commonalities if the “net degree
of strategic complementarities”, defined as the sum of all pairwise parameters of
strategic complementarities, is positive. In other words, if pairwise actions over the
network are on average more strategically complementary than substitutable, then
more common signals translate into higher equilibrium welfare. Importantly what
matters in this condition are only the pairwise direct interactions over the network:
indirect interactions over the network do not appear in this condition. At the same
time, I find that social welfare is decreasing in the commonalities if a weighted average
of pairwise interactions terms is negative, where the weights are given by agents’
centralities in the interaction network. Unlike the former condition, the dependence
on the centralities in the latter condition means that whether welfare decreases in
commonality of signals depends on both direct and indirect interactions over the
network. The existence of a wedge between the two conditions also highlights that it
may be possible for welfare to not have a monotonic behavior in signal commonalities.
Such non-monotonic behavior, which is absent in the symmetric model of Angeletos
and Pavan (2007) [17], is a consequence of the heterogeneity in interactions.
I then study the social value of information in economies that are inefficient under
incomplete information. I find that the behavior of equilibrium social welfare as a
function of the accuracy and commonality of signals depends on the extent and na-
ture of the discrepancy between the equilibrium and constrained-efficient interaction
matrices. I provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium social welfare
is monotonic with respect to information commonality and accuracy. I also consider
a special class of economies called regular economies in which I normalize the over-
all player interaction across all players. I provide results for regular economies that
generalize the findings of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17].
Taken together, my results indicate that the social value of information depends
on the intricate detail of how various agents interact with one another.
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Related Literature: The work discussed in this chapter belongs to the literature
that studies the social value of information in the presence of strategic interactions.
One of the earliest works in this area is by Morris and Shin (2002) [46], who show
that more precise public information may reduce social welfare when agents’ actions
are strategic complements. This result is sometimes interpreted as suggesting that
central banks should exercise caution in how much information they reveal to the
market Svensson [53]. On the other hand, Angeletos and Pavan (2004) [16] and Hell-
wig [34] find the seemingly contradictory result that more accurate public information
is necessarily beneficial to social welfare. These various results are integrated in a uni-
fying framework by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17], who provide a characterization
of the social value of information in the class of quadratic-payoff games. They find
that whether more precise public information increases or decreases social welfare is
tightly linked to the wedge between the equilibrium and social values of coordination:
if the social value of coordination exceeds its equilibrium value (and when actions are
strategic complements), an increase in the quality of public information necessarily
increases social welfare.
I contribute to this literature by extending the framework of Angeletos and Pavan
(2007) [17] to economies with heterogenous strategic interactions. In the presence
of such heterogeneities, the social and equilibrium values of coordination can no
longer be represented by a pair of scalars. Rather, the detailed nature of pairwise
interactions between agents would play a first-order role in determining the social
value of information. More importantly, I also find that whether more commonality
in agents’ signals increases or decreases welfare depends not only on agents’ payoffs (as
is the case in the homogeneous-interaction economy of Angeletos and Pavan (2007)
[17]), but also on the economy’s information structure.
This work is also related to the broader literature on network games. Papers
such as Ballester et al. [18], Bramouelle et al. [24], and Allouch [13] (among many
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others) study how the structure of the network of economic interactions shape eco-
nomic outcomes.2 With a few notable exceptions,3 this literature mostly focuses on
network games of complete information. In contrast, I am primarily interested in how
the interaction network and the economy’s information structure together determine
equilibrium and efficient outcomes. Within this literature, my work is most closely
related to Bergemann et al. [19], who, like me, study an incomplete-information net-
work game with quadratic payoffs. I build on their work by providing comparative
static results on how such network interactions determine the degree of equilibrium
over- and under-reaction to private signals, as well as the social value of information.
While I consider a reduced-form framework, my model is general enough to nest
a host of different micro-founded models in various contexts that study the value
of information in the presence of strategic complementarities and substitutabilities.
For example, the differentiated-product Cournot model of Myatt and Wallace (2015)
[47] can be cast as a special case of my framework. Similarly, general equilibrium
macro models such as Angeletos et al. [14], Angeletos and La’O [15], and La’O and
Tahbaz-Salehi [45], which model nominal rigidities as an informational constraint
on the firms’ price-setting behavior, have reduced-form representations that coincide
with that of my model. As a result, the insights developed in this chapter on the
social value of information can be applied to these applications.
Outline of the Chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In
Section 1.2, I provide a description of the model. In Section 1.3, I characterize
the equilibrium and constrained efficient solutions in terms of the model primitives
and provide comparative static results with respect to the information structure. In
Section 1.4, I study the social value of information. All proofs and technical details
are presented as part of the appendix.
2See Jackson and Zenou [39] and Bramouelle and Kranton [23] for a survey of this literature.
3See Calvo-Armengol and Marti Beltran [25], Galeotti et al. [29], and Bergemann et al. [19].
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1.2 Framework
1.2.1 Payoffs
Consider an economy consisting of n agents denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The payoff
of agent i is given by a quadratic function that depends on the vector of actions
a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn and a payoff state θ ∈ R, which I refer to as the economy’s
fundamental. More specifically, I assume that agent i’s payoff is given by
ui(a, θ) = aiθ −
1
2
a2i + ai
∑
j 6=i
qijaj +
∑
j,k 6=i
ajakv
(i)
jk (1.1)
where ai denotes the action of agent i. Strategic interactions between agents i 6= j are
captured by parameter qij. More specifically, qij > 0 if i’s and j’s actions are strategic
complements, qij < 0 if their actions are strategic substitutes, and qij = 0 if there
are no direct strategic interactions between i and j. I summarize these coefficients
by matrix Q = [qij], with the convention that qii = 0. I refer to Q as the economy’s
interaction matrix. As is standard in the literature, strategic interactions between
various agents can alternatively be represented by a weighted and directed graph on
n vertices. Each vertex in this graph—which I refer to as the economy’s interaction
network—corresponds to an agent and the directed edge from vertex j to vertex i
has weight qij.
In addition to the strategic interactions captured by matrix Q, agents exert di-
rect payoff externalities on one another. The payoff externalities exerted on agent i
are captured by the last term on the right-hand side of equation (1.1) and are pa-
rameterized by the n × n matrix V(i) = [v(i)jk ], with the convention that all elements
on the i-th rows and columns of V(i) are equal to zero (i.e., v
(i)
ij = v
(i)
ji = 0 for all
j). I also assume that v
(i)
jj = 0 for all i. Note that, unlike the strategic interactions
parameterized by Q, these externalities do not affect i’s marginal value of actions,
and as a result do not impact equilibrium outcomes.
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1.2.2 Information Structure
The fundamental θ is unknown to the agents and is drawn by nature according to
a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ. While agent i cannot
observe the realization of the fundamental, she receives a private signal si that is
potentially informative about θ. More specifically, I assume that the profile of signals
s = (s1, . . . , sn) and the fundamental are jointly normally distributed according toθ
s
 ∼ N
0, σ2

1 ρ′
ρ R

 , (1.2)
where R denotes the correlation matrix between agents’ private signals (with a typical
element rij = corr(si, sj) ≥ 0) and ρ is the vector of pairwise correlations between
the fundamental and private signals (with a typical element ρi = corr(θ, si) ≥ 0).
A few remarks are in order. First, note that I am assuming that all private sig-
nals and the fundamental have (unconditional) means that are equal to zero. This
is a simple normalization with no bearing on my subsequent results.4 Second, the
formulation in (1.2) also assumes that all signals and the fundamental have identical
variances. While somewhat restrictive, this assumption allows us to define the notions
of accuracy and commonality of private signals in a transparent manner. More im-
portantly, however, equation (1.2) implies that agent i’s private signal is potentially
informative about both the fundamental and other agents’ private signals.
Indeed, it is easy to see that ρi = corr(θ, si) parameterizes the extent to which
agent i’s private signal is informative about the fundamental: given her private signal,
i’s uncertainty about the realization of the fundamental is given by vari(θ) = (1 −
ρ2i )σ
2, where vari(·) = var(·|si). Thus, following the terminology of [17], I refer to ρi
4To be more specific, when the fundamental or the signals have non-zero means, the equilibrium
and team efficient actions are shifted by constants that only depend on the interaction matrix Q
but with no dependency on either R or ρ. Therefore, as long as I redefine the notion of equilibrium
over- and under-reaction in terms of the weights placed on private signals, all my comparative static
results with respect to R and ρ in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 remain unchanged.
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as the accuracy of i’s private signal. In the extreme case that ρi = 0, agent i’s signal
is completely uninformative about the underlying state, whereas when ρi = 1, agent
i’s signal fully reveals the fundamental (in fact, si = θ). Similarly, since all private
signals have the same standard deviation, rij parameterizes the extent to which agent
i’s private signal is informative about j’s. More specifically, vari(sj) = (1 − r2ij)σ2.
Thus, in the remainder of the chapter, I refer to rij is the commonality of i and j’s
information sets.
Note that the above framework exhibits two types of information frictions. First,
whenever agents have less than perfect private signals, they can only imperfectly
match their actions to the realization of the fundamental θ. The vector of accuracies
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) thus parameterizes the extent of this information friction in the
economy. Second, the fact that agents have asymmetric information means that they
are also incapable of perfectly coordinating their actions with one another, despite
the fact that they have an incentive to do so (whenever Q 6= 0). This second type of
information friction is parameterized by matrix of commonalities, R. Note that the
friction due to imperfect signals can be present even when there is no information
asymmetry between the agents.
1.3 Equilibrium and Efficient Use of Information
With the framework in Section 1.2 in hand, in this section I study the equilibrium
and efficient use of information. To this end, I first characterize the equilibrium
and (constrained) efficient allocations in terms of model primitives. I then provide
a series of comparative static results with respect to the commonality and accuracy
parameters of the information structure, i.e., R and ρ, respectively.
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1.3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
I start by defining the equilibrium. For the rest of the chapter, I use the notation
Ei(·) = E(·|si). Recall that each agent i has access to a potentially informative private
signal si about the underlying state. Therefore, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this
game is defined in the usual manner:
Definition 1.1. The equilibrium is a mapping a : Rn → Rn such that ai(si) ∈
arg maxa′i Ei[ui (a
′
i, a−i, θ)] for all i. Furthermore, a : Rn → Rn is a linear equilibrium
if the equilibrium mapping ai(si) is an affine function of si for all i.
To ensure the existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium, I impose the
following standard assumption on the nature and extent of strategic interactions
between agents.
Assumption 1.1. ρ(|Q|) < 1, where ρ denotes the spectral radius and |Q| denotes
the element-wise absolute value of interaction matrix Q.
My first result characterizes the economy’s unique equilibrium in terms of model
primitives.
Proposition 1.1. If Assumption 1.1 is satisfied, there exists a unique equilibrium in
linear strategies of the form ai = αisi for all i, where
α = (I−Q ◦R)−1ρ, (1.3)
Q is the economy’s interaction matrix, and ◦ denotes the Hadamard (element-wise)
product.
The above proposition, which is in line with the results of [19], illustrates how the
economy’s interaction matrix and information structure shape equilibrium outcomes.
In particular, it illustrates that the weight that each agent assigns to her private signal
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depends on the Hadamard product of the interaction matrix Q and the correlation
matrix of agents’ signals, R.
To see the intuition underlying the above result, it is instructive to first consider
the special case in which all agents have complete information about the fundamental.
Recall that, under complete information, all agents have perfectly accurate signals
about the fundamental and hence each others’ signals, in particular, si = θ for all i.
As a result, ρi = rij = 1. I therefore have the following corollary to Proposition 1.1:
Corollary 1.1. Under complete information, the unique equilibrium is given by ai =
αiθ for all i, where
α = (I−Q)−11 (1.4)
and Q is the matrix of relative interactions.
This corollary illustrates the well-known result that under complete information,
equilibrium actions depend on the Leontief inverse matrix (I −Q)−1 corresponding
to the economy’s interaction matrix, Q. This dependence captures the fact that, in
equilibrium, agent i’s action depends not only on the direct strategic interactions
with her neighbors, but also on all indirect interactions over the network. To see this
more explicitly, note that Assumption 1.1 guarantees that the Leontief inverse has
an infinite geometric sum representation of the form (I−Q)−1 =
∑∞
k=0 Q
k, in which
Qk captures indirect strategic interactions of order k over the network (see Stewart
[52, p. 55]). Therefore, the equilibrium action of agent i is proportional to the sum
of all direct and indirect strategic interactions over the network.
Another important observation is that equation (1.4) reduces to the well-known
result of Ballester et al. [18], according to which the equilibrium action of agent
i under complete information is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the in-
teraction network, defined as the column sums of the economy’s Leontief inverse:
b = (I−Q)−11.
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Contrasting equation (1.4) to equation (1.3) illustrates that once I introduce in-
complete information, all direct and indirect strategic interactions are modulated by
pairwise commonalities between agents’ signals. In particular, in the special case
that ρi = ρ for all agents i, the vector of equilibrium weights α under incomplete
information is proportional to the vector of equilibrium weights in an alternative
complete-information economy, in which the strength of interaction between agents i
and j is replaced by qijrij. These “modified interactions” reflect the fact that, under
incomplete information, agent i’s private signal not only informs her about the fun-
damental, but also about the private signals (and hence the actions) of other agents
in the economy. Therefore, whether agent i assigns a higher weight on her private
signal in response to stronger strategic compelementarties depends on the extent to
which i can access whether j would raise her equilibrium action. In the extreme case
that i’s private signal is uninformative about other agents’ private signals (i.e., when
rij = 0 for all j 6= i), equation (1.3) implies that αi is independent of the extent
of strategic interactions in the economy. This is exactly because, irrespective of the
value of qij, agent i’s signal does not provide her with any information about other
agents’ equilibrium actions.
I clarify this mechanism using a simple example.
Example 1. Consider an economy consisting n = 3 agents and with interaction
matrix
Q =

0 0 0
q21 0 0
0 q32 0
 , (1.5)
where I assume that q21, q32 > 0. Figure 1.1 depicts the corresponding interaction
network, where an edge from vertex i to vertex j indicates that agent j views the
action of agent i as strategic complement to her own. Also suppose V(i) = 0 for all
agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, so that there are no pure externalities in the economy. A simple
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application of Proposition 1.1 implies that the weights agents assign to their private
signals in equilibrium are given by
α1 = ρ1
α2 = ρ2 + (q21r21)ρ1
α3 = ρ3 + (q32r32)ρ2 + (q32r32)(q21r21)ρ1.
To interpret these equations, first consider agent 1. Since this agent does not face any
strategic considerations, the weight she assigns to her private signal is simply equal
to the accuracy of that signal (ρ1): the more accurate her signal, the more responsive
she is to that signal. An identical mechanism implies that similar terms also appear
in the expressions for α2 and α3: a more accurate signal (i.e., a higher ρi) enables
each agent i to better match her action to the underlying state.
The remainder of the terms in the expressions for α2 and α3 reflect the fact that
agents 2 and 3 face strategic considerations. Take the expression for α2. The fact
that q21 > 0 means that agent 2 has an incentive to raise her action in response to an
increase in 1’s action. However, whether this strategic consideration translates into a
higher weight on 2’s private signal depends on (i) the extent to which 2’s private signal
is informative about 1’s signal and (ii) the accuracy of 1’s signal ρ1, which determines
1’s equilibrium action. This is why the dependence of α2 on q21 is downweighted by
the product r21ρ1.
The logic behind the expression for α3 is similar, with indirect strategic interac-
tions between agents 1 and 3 resulting in a third term. Importantly, note that the
weight agent 3 assigns to her private signal does not depend on the commonality be-
tween the information sets of agents 1 and 3: α3 is independent of r13. This is because
a change in agent 1’s action impacts 3’s marginal benefit of raising her action only
to the extent that it results in a change in 2’s action. Therefore, what matters is the
informational commonality between agents 1 and 2 (which determines 2’s equilibrium
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Figure 1.1: A simple economy consisting of 3 agents
action) and between agents 2 and 3 (which determines 3’s best response to 2’s action).
The next result, which is an immediate corollary to Proposition 1.1, formalizes
the idea that commonality between agents matters only to the extent that they face
direct strategic interactions over the network.
Corollary 1.2. Suppose there are no direct strategic interactions between agents i
and j, i.e., qij = qji = 0. Then, the equilibrium is independent of the commonality
between i and j’s signals, rij.
I conclude with two simple comparative static results on how equilibrium actions
respond to the information structure.
Corollary 1.3. Suppose all pairwise actions are strategic complements, i.e., qij ≥ 0
for all i 6= j. Then,
(a) the weights agents assign to their private signals are increasing in all signal ac-
curacies;
(b) the weights agents assign to their private signals are increasing in the extent of
strategic complementarities;
(c) the weights agents assign to their private signals are increasing in all pairwise
commonalities.
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Statement (a) is a fairly straightforward result: all else equal, a more accurate sig-
nal about the fundamental translates into higher equilibrium weights on that signal.
Statement (b) mirrors standard results for the benchmark of network games of com-
plete information: an increase in the extent of strategic complementarities increases
the coordination motive between agents and their neighbors, and hence, raises their
incentives to respond more aggressively to their private signal. These strategic ef-
fects then spill over the network due to indirect interactions between agents. Finally,
statement (c) of Corollary 1.3 illustrates the role of agents’ private signals in the
above-mentioned mechanism: a higher commonality between si and sj means that
agent i has a more precise estimate for j’s private signal and hence her equilibrium
action. Therefore, an increase in commonality, coupled with the underlying strategic
interactions, translates into a higher weight on i’s private signal.
Corollary 1.4. There exists q̂ < 0 such that if qij ∈ (q̂, 0) for all i 6= j then
(a) the weight agent i assigns to her signal is increasing in ρi and decreasing in ρj
for all j 6= i.
(b) the weight agent i assigns to her signal is decreasing in rik and is increasing in
rjk when i 6∈ {j, k};
This result is the counterpart to Corollary 1.3 when all actions are strategic sub-
stitutes, though under the stronger assumption that there exists an upper bound |q̂|
on the intensity of strategic substitutabilities between actions. When the substitu-
tions in the economy are small, the first order impact of changing the accuracy of
player’s signal on themselves is due to the convexity of their own payoff. Hence their
equilibrium weight is necessarily increasing in their own accuracy. However, the first
order impact of changing a player’s accuracy on a neighboring player must be due
to the first order interaction between them, which is substitutive. Hence the second
player’s equilibrium weight is decreasing in the first player’s accuracy. In a simi-
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lar fashion, changing a player’s commonality with their neighbor necessarily impacts
the neighbor through their first order substitutive interaction. Hence the neighbor’s
equilbrium weight is decreasing in the player’s commonality. However, changing the
commonality of two players’ necessarily impacts a third player through the second
order interaction which is complementary. Therefore, the third player’s equilibrium
weight is increasing in the commonality of the first two players.
1.3.2 Constrained-Efficient Solution
I next turn to defining and characterizing the (constrained) efficient outcome in my
economy. Such a result provides me with a benchmark to define the extent to which
agents’ equilibrium actions over- or under-react to their private information. I start
with the following standard definition:
Definition 1.2. A strategy profile a∗ : Rn → Rn is constrained-efficient if
a∗i (si) ∈ arg max
a′i
n∑
j=1
Ei[uj(a, θ)]
for all i.
The above definition implies that in the constrained-efficient solution, the social
planner assigns actions to individual agents in order to maximize the social welfare,
without transferring information between them. Put differently, the planner maxi-
mizes the social welfare while being subject to the same informational constraints as
the agents. As a result, under such an efficiency benchmark, the planner internalizes
any (payoff or informational) externalities between the agents.
In order to characterize the constrained-efficient solution, first note that social
welfare in this economy is given by W (a, θ) =
∑n
i=1 ui(a, θ), which, in view of equation
(1.1), can be expressed as
W (a, θ) = θ
n∑
i=1
ai −
1
2
n∑
i=1
a2i +
1
2
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
q∗ijaiaj, (1.6)
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where q∗ij is the (i, j) element of matrix
Q∗ = Q + Q′ + V + V′ (1.7)
and V is an n×n matrix given by V =
∑n
i=1 V
(i). I impose the following assumption
on Q∗ for the rest of the chapter:
Assumption 1.2. Q∗ ≺ I. Furthermore, ρ(|Q∗|) < 1.
The first part of the assumption guarantees that the social welfare W (a, θ) in
equation (1.6) is concave in the vector of actions a. The second part of the assumption
is the counterpart to Assumption 1.1 for the planner’s problem: it guarantees the
existence of a unique constrained-efficient solution for all information structures. My
next result formalizes this claim:
Proposition 1.2. There exists a unique constrained-efficient strategy profile in linear
strategies of the form a∗i = α
∗
i si for all i, where
α∗ = (I−Q∗ ◦R)−1ρ, (1.8)
Q∗ is given by (1.7), and ◦ denotes the Hadamard (element-wise) product.
Comparing Proposition 1.2 to Proposition 1.1 illustrates that the constrained-
efficient strategy profile has the same exact functional form as the equilibrium profile
in equation (1.3), except that the interaction matrix Q is replaced by Q∗. This
disparity is due to the fact that the social planner internalizes the impact of agents’
actions on one another.
Once again, it is instructive to first consider the benchmark with complete infor-
mation. From equation (1.8), it is immediate that, under complete information, the
weight that the planner assigns to agent i’s private signal is given by α∗i = b
∗
i , where
b∗ = (I−Q∗)−11 is the vector of Bonacich centralities of agents in a network defined
by Q∗. In contrast, recall from Corollary 1.1 that the weight that agent i assigns to
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her private signal in equilibrium is equal to her Bonacich centrality bi constructed
from matrix Q. Therefore, the wedge between centrality vectors b and b∗ captures
the extent to which payoff externalities (including any strategic interactions) result
in an inefficient equilibrium under complete information.
Importantly, equations (1.3) and (1.8) also illustrate that whether an equilibrium
is efficient depends not only on matrices Q and Q∗, but also on the economy’s in-
formation structure, as summarized by the commonality and accuracy parameters
R and ρ. In particular, they imply that an equilibrium is efficient if and only if
(I−Q ◦R)−1ρ = (I−Q∗ ◦R)−1ρ. Thus, holding agents’ payoffs constant, the econ-
omy may be efficient under one particular information structure, even though it is
inefficient under others. This is a consequence of the mechanism discussed in Sub-
section 1.3.1 and Example 1: how strategic interactions manifest themselves depends
on what agents can infer about others’ actions from their private signals. Therefore,
starting from an efficient economy, a change in the information structure can result
in an inefficient economy.
1.3.3 Equilibrium Over- and Under-reaction
Having characterized the equilibrium and the constrained-efficient outcomes, I now
study how model primitives shape the wedge between two. I am particularly inter-
ested in the extent to which agents’ equilibrium actions over- or under-react to their
private signals—as compared to the efficiency benchmark—under different informa-
tion structures.
I start with the following result, which characterizes the conditions under which
equilibrium and efficient actions coincide irrespective of the economy’s information
structure.
Proposition 1.3. The equilibrium is constrained efficient under all information
structures if and only if Q = Q∗.
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Therefore, in view of equation (1.7), the equilibrium is constrained efficient for all
information structures if V + V′ = −Q. If this joint restriction on agents’ payoffs
is violated, then there is at least one information structure under which agents do
not fully internalize the impact of their actions on other agents, and hence, over- or
under-react to their private signals. My next result provides sufficient conditions on
agents’ payoffs and information structure for equilibrium over- and under-reaction.
As in the previous section, I use b = (I − Q)−11 and b∗ = (I − Q∗)−11 to denote
the vectors of agents’ Bonacich centralities in networks corresponding to Q and Q∗,
respectively.
Proposition 1.4. Suppose agents’ private signals are informative about the funda-
mental, i.e., ρi 6= 0 for all i. There exist constants r, r̄ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(a) if rij ∈ (0, r) for all i 6= j, then all agents overreact to their signals if qij > q∗ij
for all i 6= j and underreact to their signals qij < q∗ij for all i 6= j.
(b) if rij ∈ (r, 1) for all i 6= j, then all agents overreact to their signals if bi > b∗i for
all i and underreact to their signals if bi < b
∗
i for all i.
As anticipated, the above result highlights the fact that, in general, whether agents
over- or under-react in equilibrium depends not only on their payoffs (as summarized
by matrices Q and Q∗), but also on the economy’s information structure. This can
be seen more explicitly by contrasting statements (a) and (b): the restrictions on
Q and Q∗ to induce equilibrium over- and under-reaction change depending on the
pairwise commonalities rij in agents’ signals.
To see the intuition underlying Proposition 1.4, first consider statement (a), which
establishes that when all pairwise commonalities are below some threshold r, a suf-
ficient condition for whether agents over- or under-react to their private signals is
in terms of the element-wise wedge between Q and Q∗. This is because when com-
monalities are small, agents’ private signals are not particularly useful coordination
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devices beyond agents’ direct neighbors. As a result, in both equilibrium and plan-
ner’s solution, the marginal cost of increasing the weight on the signal is dominated by
the direct interactions, while the indirect interaction terms become irrelevant. Impor-
tantly, this observation also implies that the details of the interaction network—above
and beyond first-order interactions—become irrelevant.
Statement (b) of the proposition considers the polar opposite case, in which large
commonalities in signals imply that each can forecast the realizations of all other
agents’ signals with a high precision. As a result, agents’ signals inform them not only
of the realization of the fundamental but also of other agents’ actions. Consequently,
agents’ actions—whether in equilibrium or the planner’s solution—would also depend
on all direct and indirect interactions over the network. This is indeed reflected by
the condition in statement (b), which establishes that when pairwise commonalities
exceed some threshold r̄, whether agents over- or under-react in equilibrium depends
on the wedge between agents’ centralities b and b∗.
I conclude this section by a brief remark on how my results thus far compare to
an economy in which (i) pairwise strategic interactions are homogeneous and (ii) the
information structure is symmetric across all agents. In my framework, these symme-
try assumptions can be stated as qij = q, v
(k)
ij = v, and rij = r̂ for all pairs of agents
i 6= j and ρi = ρ̂ for all i. In such economies, whether agents’ overreact or under-react
to their private signals only depends on the economy’s payoff structure. Indeed, one
can readily see that by imposing the homogeneity and symmetry assumptions on the
expressions in (1.3) and (1.8): when strategic interactions are homogeneous and the
information structure is symmetric, equations (1.3) and (1.8) imply that all agents
overreact to their private signals if and only if q > q∗, where q and q∗ only depend
on the agents’ payoff. In contrast, the two parts of Proposition 1.4 illustrate that, in
the presence of heterogenous interactions, whether an agent i over- or under-reacts
to her private signal also depends on the details of the information structure.
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1.4 Social Value of Information
My results in the previous section focused on how model primitives shape the wedge
between equilibrium and constrained-efficient outcomes. In this section, I provide
comparative static results on how changes in the economy’s information structure
impact equilibrium social welfare. As in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17], I show
that whether changes in accuracy and commonality increase welfare depends on the
degree of equilibrium over- and under-reaction (i.e., the relationship between α and
α∗). However, my results also indicate that the heterogeneity in interactions (as
captured by matrix Q) plays a non-trivial role in determining the social value of
information.
I start by focusing on economies that are efficient under all information structures.
I then extend the analysis to economies that may be inefficient for certain information
structures.
1.4.1 Efficient Economies
Recall from Proposition 1.3 that the equilibrium and constrained-efficient outcomes
coincide with one another irrespective of the information structure if and only if the
corresponding interaction matrices are equal, i.e., Q = Q∗. This condition guarantees
that agents’ equilibrium coordination motives align with those of the social planner.
I have the following result:
Proposition 1.5. Suppose the economy is efficient under all information structures.
(a) If qij ≥ 0 for all i 6= j, then social welfare is increasing in agents’ signal accuracy
and commonality.
(b) There exists q̂ < 0 such that if qij ∈ (q̂, 0) for all i 6= j, then social welfare is
decreasing in agents’ signal commonalities and increasing in their accuracy.
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The above result establishes that when the economy is efficient and all actions
are strategic complements, an increase in either the accuracy or the commonality
of signals increases expected social welfare. To see the intuition underlying this
result, recall from the discussion in Subsection 1.2.2 that my framework exhibits
two types of information frictions: (i) a friction that arises due to the fact that
agents have imperfect signals about the realization of the fundamental; and (ii) a
friction that arises because agents cannot perfectly coordinate their actions with one
another. An increases in either information accuracy or commonality reduces these
frictions. As a result, in the presence of strategic complementarities, the social value of
information—which, by assumption, coincides with the private value of information—
is always positive. In other words, welfare necessarily increases in both ρi and rij. This
result thus generalizes the results of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17] for the social
value of information in the presence of strategic complementarities to economies with
heterogeneous interactions.
The social value of information has a less straightforward characterization when
actions are strategic substitutes, as the detailed nature of the economy’s interaction
network also becomes relevant. To capture how network interactions shape the social
value of information in the presence of strategic substitutabilities in a transparent
manner, my next result imposes a symmetry assumption on the economy’s informa-
tion structure.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose the economy is efficient under all information structures.
Also, suppose the information structure is symmetric, with rij = r̂ for all i 6= j and
ρi = ρ̂ for all i.
(a) Social welfare is always increasing in ρ̂.
(b) If
∑
i,j qij > 0, then social welfare is increasing in r̂.
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(c) If
∑
i,j bibjqij < 0, then social welfare is decreasing in r̂, where bi is the Bonacich
centrality of i.
(d) If
∑
i,j bibjqij > 0 >
∑
i,j qij, then social welfare first decreases and then increases
in r̂.
Statement (a) of the above result establishes that social welfare is necessarily
increasing in the common accuracy parameter ρ̂. This is to be expected: all else equal,
more accurate signals enable agents to better match their actions with the underlying
fundamental, thus reducing the friction due to imperfect signals. When coupled with
the assumption that the private value of information coincides with the social value
of information (Q = Q∗), more accuracy translates into higher equilibrium social
welfare.
While an increase in accuracy unambiguously increases social welfare, the wel-
fare impact of an increase in commonalities depends on the nature and intensity of
strategic interactions. Statements (b)–(d) of Proposition 1.6 provide a full taxon-
omy of conditions for the range of possible outcomes as a function of the underlying
interaction network.
Statement (b) of the proposition illustrates that social welfare is increasing in the
commonality parameter r̂ if the net degree of strategic complementarities, given by∑
i,j qij is strictly positive. In other words, if pairwise actions over the network are
on average more strategically complementary than substitutable, then more common
signals translate into higher equilibrium welfare. Importantly what matters in this
condition are only the pairwise direct interactions over the network: indirect inter-
actions over the network do not appear in this condition. Also, note that when all
actions are strategic complements (i.e., qij ≥ 0 for all i, j), the condition in statement
(b) is automatically satisfied, guaranteeing that welfare is increasing in commonality
of signals (consistent with Proposition 1.5).
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Statement (c) of Proposition 1.6 provides a condition under which social wel-
fare is decreasing in the commonality parameter r̂. Note that, in contrast to the
previous statement, this condition is not in terms of the net degree of strategic com-
plementarities. Rather, the degree of strategic complementarity between agents i
and j is weighted by their respective Bonacich centralities: welfare decreases in r̂ if∑
i,j bibjqij < 0. This has two important consequences. First, unlike the condition in
statement (b), the dependence on the centralities means that the condition in state-
ment (c) depends on both direct and indirect interactions over the network. Second,
Proposition 1.6(c) establishes that welfare decreases with informational commonality
if actions of more central agents are strategic substitutes with those of other central
agents.
The wedge between the conditions in statements (b) and (c) of Proposition 1.6
highlights that it may be possible for welfare to not have a monotonic behavior in r̂.
Indeed, statement (d) of the proposition establishes that when both conditions are
violated (so that
∑
i,j bibjqij > 0 >
∑
i,j qij), then social welfare is first decreasing and
then increasing in r̂. This non-monotonic behavior, which is absent in the symmetric
model of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17], is entirely driven by the heterogeneity in
interactions. To see the intuition underlying this result, note that when r̂ is small—so
agents have fairly imprecise information about others’ signals—they base their actions
solely on direct interactions over the network. Therefore, the relevant condition is
the condition on first-order interactions. However, as r̂ increases and gets closer to
1, higher-order interactions become important as well and therefore the condition in
terms of centralities appears.
Example 2. Consider the fully symmetric economy depicted in Figure 1.2(a), in
which all pairwise interactions are identical, i.e., qij = q for all i 6= j. This means
that the interaction matrix can be written as Q = q(11′ − I). This economy is
therefore the discrete counterpart of the symmetric-interaction economy of Angeletos
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: Interaction networks corresponding to two economies. Each vertex corresponds
to an agent, with a directed edge present from vertex j to vertex i if qij 6= 0.
and Pavan (2007) [17].
It is easy to verify that, in this economy, all agents have identical Bonacich cen-
tralities given by bi =
1
(n−1)q−1 . Consequently, the net and centrality-weighted degrees
of strategic complementarities in the economy are given by
∑
i,j
qij = n(n− 1)q
∑
i,j
bibjqij =
n(n− 1)q
((n− 1)q − 1)2
,
respectively. This, coupled with Proposition 1.6, shows that when there is no het-
erogeneity in the intensity of interactions, the sign of q determines whether welfare
increases or decreases with informational commonality between various agents: when
q > 0 (so that actions are strategic complements) ex ante welfare is increasing in
commonality, whereas when q < 0 (so that actions are strategic substitutes) welfare
is decreasing in commonality. These observations are, of course, in line with the
results of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17] for homogeneous-interaction economies.
Example 3. Next, consider the economy with the star interaction network depicted
in Figure 1.2(b), where q1i = qi1 = q for all i 6= 1 and qij = 0 otherwise. As in the
previous example, scalar q ∈ (− 1√
n−1 ,
1√
n−1) parameterizes the intensity of strategic
interactions, where the restrictions on q are imposed to ensure that Assumptions 1.1
and 1.2 are satisfied. However, in contrast to Example 2, strategic interactions in this
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economy are asymmetric. Once again, I assume that V + V′ = −Q to ensure that
the economy is efficient under all information structures.
It is easy to verify that the net and centrality-weighted degrees of strategic com-
plementarities in this economy are given by
∑
i,j
qij = 2(n− 1)q
∑
i,j
bibjqij =
2(n− 1)q(1 + q)(1 + (n− 1)q)
(1− (n− 1)q2)2
,
respectively. Therefore, by statement (b) of Proposition 1.6, welfare is increasing in
r̂ if q > 0, which is the case when all actions are strategic complements. Of course,
this is also consistent with the prediction of Proposition 1.5. On the other hand,
by Proposition 1.6(c), welfare in this economy is decreasing in r̂ if − 1
n−1 < q <
0. Finally, statement (d) of the proposition implies that if the degree of strategic
substitutabilities becomes stronger (and in particular, when q < 1
n−1), then welfare
first decreases and then increases in r̂. In other words, the comparative static results
ith respect to r̂ change as the degree of strategic substitutabilities.
To see why, note that when q is negative, all pairwise actions between neigh-
boring agents are strategic substitutes. But this means that second-order indirect
interactions exhibit strategic complementarities.5 When q is negative but small in
magnitude, the direct interactions always dominate the effect of indirect, higher-order
interactions. As a result, an increase in informational commonality unambiguously
reduces welfare. In contrast, once the degree of strategic substitutabilities becomes
stronger (in the sense that q becomes more negative), then the indirect (and comple-
mentarity) interactions also become important. Whether these higher-order interac-
tions dominate the direct interactions then depends on the commonality parameter
r̂. For smaller values of r̂, the direct first-order strategic substitutabilities dominate
5More generally, all odd- and even-ordered interactions exhibit strategic substitutabilities and
complementarities, respectively.
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and so the ex ante social welfare is decreasing. As r̂ increases, the higher-order com-
plementary interactions become more prominent and the social welfare eventually
increases in r̂.
1.4.2 Inefficient Economies
Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 in the previous subsection provide comparative static results
with respect to the information structure in efficient economies. These results, how-
ever, rely on the efficiency assumption, which guarantees that the social and private
values of information coincide with one another irrespective of the economy’s infor-
mation structure. In the remainder of this section, I extend my earlier results to the
class of economies that may be inefficient under some or all information structures.
I start with the generalization of Proposition 1.5.
Proposition 1.7. If q∗ij ≥ qij ≥ 0 for all pairs of agents i 6= j, then social welfare is
increasing in agents’ signal accuracy and commonality.
In other words, as long as pairwise actions are strategic complements and the so-
cial value of coordination between any pair of agents is at least as high as the private
value of coordination, an increase in either the accuracy or the commonality of sig-
nals increases expected social welfare. The intuition behind this result mirrors that
of Proposition 1.5. Recall from the discussion in Subsection 1.2.2 that my framework
exhibits two types of information frictions: (i) a friction that arises due to the fact
that agents have imperfect signals about the realization of the fundamental; and (ii)
a friction that arises because agents cannot perfectly coordinate their actions with
one another. Therefore, an increases in either information accuracy or commonal-
ity reduces these frictions and facilitates coordination between the agents. Finally,
the assumption that the planner values coordination at least as much as the agents
guarantees that such an increase also translates into higher social welfare. This re-
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sult thus generalizes the results of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17] for the social
value of information in the presence of strategic complementarities to economies with
heterogeneous interactions.
My next result provides a series of sufficient conditions under which social welfare
is decreasing in the commonality parameter.
Proposition 1.8. Consider an economy with a symmetric information structure, in
the sense that rij = r̂ for all i 6= j and ρi = ρ̂ for all i.
(a) Suppose qij ≥ 0 ≥ q∗ij for all pairs of agents i 6= j. Then, there exists r̄ < 1 such
that social welfare is decreasing in r̂ for all r̂ ∈ (r̄, 1).
(b) There exist q < 0 and r̄ < 1 such that if q ≤ qij ≤ q∗ij ≤ 0 for all i 6= j, then
social welfare is decreasing in r̂ for all r̂ ∈ (r̄, 1).
To see the intuition underlying the above result, note that when the commonality
parameter r̄ is sufficiently close to 1, agents have fairly precise information about
each others’ signals (and hence, actions). Therefore, when all pairwise actions are
strategic complements (i.e., qij ≥ 0 for all i 6= j as in statement (a)), in response to an
increase in the commonality of signals, r̂, agents assign higher weights on their private
signals (as established in Corollary 1.3(c)), which in turn implies that the equilibrium
actions of any pair of agents i 6= j become more coordinated. But the assumption
that q∗ij ≤ 0 means that such an increase in coordinations is socially inefficient from
the planner’s perspective. Therefore, an increase in r̂ reduces social welfare.
Next consider the condition in part (b). In this case, the planner values coordi-
nation at least as much as agents. However, the fact that all actions are strategic
substitutes from both the agents’ and planner’s perspectives guarantees that an in-
crease in commonality translates into lower social welfare when these substitutions are
sufficiently small. Consequently, the ex ante equilibrium social welfare is decreasing
in r̂.
34
My next result provides a counterpart to Proposition 1.6 for the class of inefficient
economies. As before, let b = (I−Q)−11 denote the vector of Bonacich centralities
corresponding to the interaction matrix Q.
Proposition 1.9. Consider an economy with a symmetric information structure, in
the sense that rij = r̂ for all i 6= j and ρi = ρ̂ for all i.
(a) There exists r such that social welfare is increasing in r̂ in (0, r) if and only if∑
i,j q
∗
ij > 0.
(b) Suppose the economy is efficient under complete information. Then there exists
r̄ such that social welfare is increasing in r̂ in (r̄, 1) if and only if
∑
i,j q
∗
ijbibj > 0.
This result thus (partially) generalizes Proposition 1.6 to the class of inefficient
economies. In particular, statement (a) states that the behavior of the social welfare
in the small-commonality regime depends only on the net degree of complementarity
between agents—much like in statement (b) of Proposition 1.6—but from the plan-
ner’s perspective. Similarly, statement (b) of Proposition 1.9 establishes that when
the economy is efficient under complete information, the behavior of the social welfare
depends on the weighted sum
∑
i,j bibjq
∗
ij of the planner’s complementarities, where
the weights are given by the agents’ Bonacich centralities. A point of note is that since
Q 6= Q∗ in inefficient economies, I do not necessarily have that
∑
i,j q
∗
ijbibj >
∑
i,j q
∗
ij.
Therefore, unlike in completely efficient economies, it is possible for social welfare to
be increasing with respect to the commonality in the small-commonality regime but
decreasing in the large-commonality regime.
1.4.3 Regular Economies
While intuitive, Propositions 1.7 and 1.8 impose fairly stringent assumptions on all
direct pairwise interactions simultaneously. For example, Proposition 1.7 requires
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that (i) all pairwise interactions are strategically complementarity over the network
and (ii) the social value of coordination, q∗ij, is at least as high as the private value
of coordination, qij, for all pairs of agents i 6= j. I conclude this section by relaxing
these assumptions and illustrating that the same forces that underpin the results in
Propositions 1.7 and 1.8 lead to similar results under more general conditions.
In order to obtain such a generalization, I focus on the class of regular economies,
defined as follows:
Definition 1.3. An economy is regular if
∑
j 6=i qij =
∑
j 6=k qkj for all pairs of agents
i and k.
In a regular economy, the aggregate degree of strategic interactions of any given
agent with the rest of the agents in the economy is constant across all agents i.
The symmetric-interaction economy of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) [17]—studied in
Example 2 and depicted in Figure 1.2(a)—clearly belongs to the class of regular
economies. However, this class also contains more general economies with heteroge-
nous pairwise interactions across agents. Also note that the regularity condition does
not impose any sign restrictions on pairwise interactions qij. For example, an econ-
omy may be regular even if qij > 0 > qkl for pairs of agent (i, j) and (k, l). I have the
following result:
Proposition 1.10. Consider a regular economy with a symmetric information struc-
ture in the sense that rij = r̂ for all i 6= j and ρi = ρ̂ for all i.
(a) If
∑
i,j q
∗
ij >
∑
i,j qij > 0, then social welfare is increasing in r̂.
(b) If
∑
i,j q
∗
ij <
∑
i,j qij < 0, then there exists q < 0 such that if q <
∑
i,j qij < 0,
social welfare is decreasing in r̂.
Proposition 1.10 is a generalization of the analogous result in Angeletos and Pavan
(2007) [17] for inefficient economies. In part (a), as previously seen in Proposition
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1.7, the planner values coordination at least as much as the agents. As a result,
when there is a net degree of strategic complementarity in the economy, an increase
in the commonality causes an increase in the social welfare. Part (b) of the above
result then establishes the flip side of the condition in part (a): agents coordinate
to a greater than optimal degree. As a result, when strategic substitutabilities are
not too large, any increase in the commonality necessarily results in a decrease in
the social welfare. Compared to Proposition 1.7, the regularity of the interaction
network in Proposition 1.10 allows me to impose the sufficient conditions on the
aggregate degree of complementarity instead of imposing the same on every pairwise
degree of coordination.
1.5 Conclusion and Future Work
I find that heterogeneity of strategic interactions in an economy affects both the pri-
vate and social value of information. Specifically, in equilibrium, I find that a player
within an economy with a fixed set of payoffs can potentially both overreact and
underreact with respect to the constrained-efficient action as one changes the under-
lying information structure. This behavior primarily results due to the heterogeneous
nature of interactions and is absent when the interactions are homogeneous. I find
that in the presence of strategic complementarities, a player’s signal becomes more
prominent to their respective equilibrium action as the information commonality and
accuracy increase. However, the opposite is not necessarily true when the economy
exhibits heterogeneous substitutions – this is because the even-numbered higher order
effects due to first-order substitutions are always complementary and when interac-
tion heterogeneities are introduced, one can potentially encounter a situation in which
these even-numbered complementary interactions dominate over the odd-numbered
substitutive interactions. This can give rise to novel social-welfare behavior that is
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unseen in homogeneous economies. Specifically, I find that social welfare in efficient
economies can be non-monotonic with respect to the information commonality. I
also provide sufficient conditions under which social welfare is monotonic in ineffi-
cient economies and the give the intuition behind these results.
The insights that I develop in this work can be useful when studying the social
welfare considerations in problems such as the peer-effect model in Ballester et al.
[18], the differentiated-product Cournot model of Myatt and Wallace (2015) [47],
the generalized beauty-contest payoff economy in Myatt and Wallace (2019) [48] and
price-setting behavior in production networks seen in La’O and Tahbaz-Salehi [45],
Angeletos et al. [14] and Angeletos and La’O [15]. Going forward, a natural exten-
sion would be to incorporate my framework in the pricing of information products
discussed in Bimpikis et al. (2019) [21]. Specifically, one could study how heteroge-
neous interactions among buyers affect the offer and pricing decisions faced by the
monopolistic seller. Another extension would be to apply my framework to Cando-
gan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar ([20] which considers the problem of optimally pricing
products with network externalities where interaction heterogeneities can arise en-
dogenously due to the optimal price discrimination employed by the seller.
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Chapter 2
Are the Federal Reserve’s Stress Test Results Predictable?
2.1 Introduction
Regulatory stress tests have become a central tool for enhancing the resilience of the
banking system. The current era of stress testing began with the 2009 Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), which played an important role in turning
around the financial crisis in the United States. The SCAP tested the ability of the
largest U.S. bank holding companies to withstand a further worsening of economic
conditions, and it combined this test with a government backstop for banks needing
additional capital. In a major departure from customary supervisory practice, results
of the SCAP were made public. The release of this information is credited with
helping to restore market confidence by reducing uncertainty about the state of the
financial system and by making the government’s response transparent. See Hirtle,
Schuermann, and Stiroh [37] for further discussion of the SCAP’s information content
and its importance to the program.
The success of stress testing in the SCAP led to the Federal Reserve’s Comprehen-
sive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing
(DFAST) program. I will provide background on these programs in the next section,
but their supervisory stress testing components are broadly similar to the SCAP’s.
The Federal Reserve defines a small number of scenarios through economic and fi-
nancial variables, and the banks and their supervisors evaluate bank losses resulting
from these scenarios. In several but not all cases, summary information on stress
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losses by bank and asset category have then been made public.
The results of these stress tests are pivotal in setting bank capital levels and
allowed distributions. Stress testing has overshadowed the use of internal bank models
to calculate risk-weighted assets, which drove capital requirements for the largest
banks prior to the financial crisis. The annual execution of the CCAR/DFAST process
has become an enormous undertaking for the banks covered by these programs and
their supervisors.
Despite the complexity of this process, using results made public thus far across
various stress tests I find that projected losses by bank and loan category are fairly
predictable and are becoming increasingly so. In particular, losses for DFAST 2019
and 2020 are nearly perfectly correlated for banks that participated both years. Most
of this article documents these findings.
That stress losses would become predictable from one year to the next should
not be surprising. If a bank’s portfolio and the Fed’s scenarios remain reasonably
consistent over time, so should the bank’s stress test results. In its first year of
participation in the stress tests, a bank needs to make major investments in staff and
information technology; over time, the process matures and becomes more routine.
Indeed, consulting firms and software vendors have made a business of trying to
simplify and standardize the stress testing process for banks to make it more routine.
The models used by the Fed to define scenarios and project losses have also been
refined and should change less over time. Banks have incentives to avoid investments
that will attract high capital requirements through the stress tests. As discussed
in Schuermann [51], they also face incentives to align their internal risk assessments
with the Federal Reserve’s. All of these factors contribute to making outcomes more
predictable over time.
But whereas the results of stress tests may be predictable, the results of actual
shocks to the financial system are not, and herein lies the concern. The process of
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maturation that makes stress test results more predictable may also make the stress
tests less effective. One should be careful in extrapolating from the early success
of the SCAP and its immediate successors to assume that the same process will
continue to be effective in the future. The SCAP worked, in part, by providing new
information. To the extent that stress test results become more predictable, they
become less informative.
Several authors including Acharya, Engle, and Pierret [12], Covas, Lump, and
Zakrajsek [26], Guerrieri and Welch [33], Hirtle et al. [36], and Kapinos and Mitnik
[41], have developed models for bank stress testing using public data. These models
seek to forecast bank vulnerability as an alternative or complement to supervisory
stress tests. My focus is different: I am interested in the predictability of the outcomes
of the supervisory stress tests themselves, rather than in more accurate forecasting
of bank vulnerability. Hirtle et al. [36] find significant correlation between their
forecasts and DFAST outcomes, consistent with the predictability of the outcomes.
One way to reduce predictability is to increase the number and diversity of sce-
narios evaluated in a stress test. I compare results for the two stress scenarios used
in DFAST 2014 – 2019 and find an oddly high degree of correlation across scenar-
ios by bank and by loan category. This pattern is particularly surprising given the
large number of variables used to define the scenarios. The pattern suggests a missed
opportunity to diversify the types of stresses tested.
The next section provides additional background on supervisory stress tests. I
then compare the results for the two stress scenarios in DFAST 2014 to DFAST 2019.
The next two sections compare predictability across time, first for loss levels and
then for loss rates. I then examine the stock market reaction to announcements of
stress test results; consistent with the predictability of the results, in most years, I
find no significant correlation between the severity of a bank’s reported stress losses
and the change in its stock price relative to the market. I conclude the chapter with
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comments on how the limitations of predictable stress tests might be countered.
2.2 Background on Supervisory Bank Stress
Tests
My analysis draws on results from the ten rounds of stress tests conducted so far:
SCAP 2009, CCAR 2012, DFAST 2013, DFAST 2014, DFAST 2015, DFAST 2016,
DFAST 2017, DFAST 2018, DFAST 2019 and DFAST 2020. For background, I review
the essential features of these programs.
2.2.1 SCAP
The SCAP was launched in February 2009 and its results announced that May. It
had the following features:
◦ Scope: The program applied to the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs):
American Express, Bank of America, Bank of New York/Mellon, BB&T, Capi-
tal One Financial, Citigroup, Fifth Third, Goldman Sachs, GMAC, JPMorgan
Chase, KeyCorp, MetLife, Morgan Stanley, PNC Financial, Regions Financial,
State Street, SunTrust, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo. MetLife exited banking
in 2013 and has not been covered by the bank stress tests since then. The
remaining group of 18 are the common participants across all rounds of stress
tests. GMAC changed its name to Ally Financial after the SCAP.
◦ Scenarios: The SCAP used a baseline scenario and a more adverse scenario de-
fined through a two-year decline in GDP and house prices and an increase in
unemployment. A separate market shock similar to the second half of 2008 was
applied to trading portfolios.
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◦ Asset categories: Projected losses were calculated for five loan categories: first-
lien mortgages, junior-lien mortgages, commercial and industrial (C&I) loans,
commercial real estate (CRE) loans, and credit cards. Projected losses were
calculated for banks’ securities portfolios and for the trading portfolios of the
five banks with large trading positions.
◦ Disclosure: Projected loss amounts and loss rates under the more adverse scenario
were disclosed by asset category for each bank in Board of Governors [1].
The SCAP report also disclosed projected capital levels by bank, but I focus exclu-
sively on projected losses.
2.2.2 CCAR
There was no supervisory stress test in 2010. CCAR, launched in 2011, differed from
the SCAP in putting greater emphasis on the capital planning process and on the
robustness of the processes employed by the participating BHCs in their internal risk
management; see Board of Governors [3]. I focus exclusively on the stress testing
component of the review.
CCAR 2011 applied to the same bank holding companies as the SCAP. The ad-
verse scenario was enriched to specify a path of the economy over nine quarters for
nine economic and financial variables. The scenario was made public, but no bank-
specific results were disclosed. CCAR 2011 is therefore not part of my analysis.
CCAR 2012 again applied to the same nineteen bank holding companies as the
SCAP. The Fed’s adverse scenario was further expanded to define paths for 25 vari-
ables, including more international factors. The loan categories were expanded to
include consumer loans and a category called Other Loans. Projected stress losses
were disclosed by bank and category under the Fed’s adverse scenario. Banks were
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also required to define their own scenarios and estimate stress losses in these scenarios,
but those results were not made public.
2.2.3 DFAST
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed by Congress in July 2010, includes requirements for
annual regulatory stress tests, commonly referred to as DFAST. The act requires
at least three scenarios — a baseline, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse
scenario.
DFAST 2013 applied to the same bank holding companies as the SCAP, except
for MetLife. DFAST 2014 covered all bank holding companies with over $50 billion
in consolidated assets, bringing the number of reporting BHCs to 30. The group will
continue to grow because the Dodd-Frank Act’s stress testing provisions apply to all
banks (and certain other financial companies) with over $10 billion in consolidated
assets. The number of participating banks has mostly been stable from 2014 onwards,
with a few additions in between. For example, DB USA Corporation and MUFG
Americas Holdings Corporation were added to the list in 2015, TD Group US Holdings
LLC in 2016, RBC US Group Holdings LLC in 2018 and Truist Financial Corporation
in 2020. The most significant change to bank participation criteria occured in 2019
when the Federal Reserve provided relief to less-complex firms with total consolidated
assets between $100 billion and $250 billion by moving them to an two-year stress
test cycle. Consequently, there were only 18 banks participating in DFAST 2019.
This change in bank participating criteria reflects the smaller risk that these firms
present. See Federal Reserve’s reports Board of Governors [10? ] for a more detailed
discussion.
In DFAST 2013 and DFAST 2020, results were disclosed for the severely adverse
scenario only. In DFAST 2014 to DFAST 2019, results were disclosed for both the
adverse and severely adverse scenarios. I will compare results for the two scenarios
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in the next section.
Projected losses under DFAST are used as inputs to the CCAR capital planning
process, so the two programs operate in parallel. DFAST provides public information
on the capital strength of large banks, but CCAR is much more comprehensive and
determines a large bank’s ability to pay dividends or repurchase shares. I focus on
the results of the stress tests.
DFAST requires banks to run and disclose two types of stress tests, in addition
to the results calculated and reported by supervisors. Banks must disclose their own
loss projections under the Federal Reserve’s scenarios, and they are also required
to run mid-cycle stress tests using their own scenarios and loss projections. See
Hirtle, Kovner, and McKay [35] for a comparison of the Fed’s and bank’s results for
the Fed’s scenarios. I will use only the annual supervisory results in my analysis; I
expect that the mid-cycle disclosures by individual companies would only enhance
the predictability of the supervisory tests.
Data
I compiled data on projected loss amounts and loss rates by bank and by loan category
from the Federal Reserve’s reports Board of Governors [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report summary statistics on projected losses (in billions of dollars)
and Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report summary statistics on loss rates (in percent).
I focus primarily on projected losses on loans. Trading and counterparty shocks
apply only to a subset of the participating bank holding companies, and this part of
the stress test operates differently from the rest of the program. The details of the
market shock were not made public prior to 2013.
Figure 2.1 compares the loss rate distributions across the CCAR 2012 and DFAST
2013 – 2020. For each histogram, I pool loss rates for all loan categories and all banks.
The distributions for all the rounds of stress tests are similar to each other, consistent
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Year Category Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
2009
First Liens 7.3 1.9 10.4 0.1 32.4
Junior Liens 6.4 1.7 7.8 0.6 21.4
C&I 3.5 1.5 4.6 0.0 15.7
CRE 3.3 2.9 2.7 0.2 9.4
Credit Cards 6.9 3.2 8.4 0.0 21.2
All Loans 32.8 12.6 41.6 5.4 136.6
2012
First Liens 3.8 1.5 5.6 0.0 17.7
Junior Liens 3.5 1.2 5.1 0.0 16.0
C&I 3.7 1.9 4.5 0.0 12.3
CRE 1.4 0.8 1.7 0.0 6.7
Credit Cards 7.1 3.2 9.1 0.1 27.0
Other Consumer 1.4 0.6 2.1 0.0 8.1
Other Loans 0.9 0.3 1.3 0.0 4.8
All Loans 18.9 7.2 24.8 0.3 70.1
2013
First Liens 3.8 1.2 5.5 0.0 15.3
Junior Liens 2.3 1.0 3.1 0.0 9.4
C&I 3.4 1.7 3.5 0.0 11.1
CRE 1.9 0.9 2.5 0.0 9.6
Credit Cards 6.7 3.2 8.0 0.1 23.3
Other Consumer 1.5 0.6 1.9 0.0 6.5
Other Loans 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.0 2.9
All Loans 17.6 6.7 21.3 0.3 57.5
2014
First Liens 3.2 0.9 5.0 0.0 15.7
Junior Liens 2.4 0.8 3.5 0.0 9.9
C&I 3.1 1.5 3.2 0.0 9.4
CRE 2.2 1.1 2.6 0.0 9.4
Credit Cards 6.5 2.8 8.0 0.1 24.8
Other Consumer 1.5 0.7 1.8 0.0 6.1
Other Loans 1.1 0.4 1.7 0.0 5.8
All Loans 17.4 5.5 21.4 0.5 55.5
2015
First Liens 1.3 0.4 2.1 0.0 7.3
Junior Liens 1.1 0.3 2.1 0.0 8.2
C & I 2.2 0.9 2.9 0.0 10.9
CRE 1.7 1.2 2.1 0.0 10.3
Credit Cards 2.7 0.1 5.3 0.0 20.9
Other Consumer 1.1 0.3 1.7 0.0 5.9
Other Loans 0.9 0.3 1.7 0.0 7.1
All Loans 11.0 5.1 15.2 0.6 49.7
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for loss levels (in billions of dollars) across loan cate-
gories for SCAP 2009, CCAR 2012, DFAST 2013, DFAST 2014 and DFAST 2015.
with the view that the overall process has stabilized over time. For illustration, I
have superimposed on the histograms a probability density estimated from the 2012–
2020 data.1 The consistency in the distributions is surprising given the increasing
complexity of the underlying stress scenarios and the expansion in the number of
participating banks starting in 2014.
1I fit a gamma distribution with shape parameter 2.3 and scale parameter 3.1 to the 2012–2020
data. The density is multiplied by three in the charts for ease of comparison.
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Year Category Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
2016
First Liens 1.2 0.4 1.9 0.0 7.5
Junior Liens 1.0 0.3 2.0 0.0 10.1
C & I 2.8 1.4 3.6 0.0 13.7
CRE 1.6 1.0 2.0 0.0 10.0
Credit Cards 2.8 0.1 5.6 0.0 21.1
Other Consumer 1.1 0.5 1.6 0.0 6.5
Other Loans 1.2 0.4 2.0 0.0 8.0
All Loans 11.7 5.2 15.8 0.4 53.7
2017
First Liens 0.8 0.3 1.2 0.0 4.9
Junior Liens 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.0 3.5
C & I 2.9 1.7 3.7 0.0 15.9
CRE 1.6 1.2 2.1 0.0 11.4
Credit Cards 2.9 0.1 6.0 0.0 21.7
Other Consumer 1.2 0.5 1.7 0.0 6.8
Other Loans 1.3 0.4 2.2 0.0 8.6
All Loans 11.3 5.4 15.0 0.5 54.0
2018
First Liens 1.0 0.4 1.6 0.0 6.3
Junior Liens 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.0 2.8
C & I 3.2 1.8 4.3 0.0 18.1
CRE 1.8 1.4 2.4 0.0 12.9
Credit Cards 3.2 0.1 6.4 0.0 23.1
Other Consumer 1.1 0.4 1.5 0.0 5.1
Other Loans 1.5 0.5 2.6 0.0 10.5
All Loans 12.3 5.7 16.3 0.1 61.8
2019
First Liens 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.0 3.2
Junior Liens 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.3
C & I 4.0 1.8 5.2 0.0 17.3
CRE 1.8 1.0 2.5 0.0 10.0
Credit Cards 6.0 0.6 9.3 0.0 26.5
Other Consumer 1.2 0.5 1.6 0.0 5.2
Other Loans 2.4 0.9 3.1 0.1 10.8
All Loans 16.4 6.5 20.1 0.1 60.2
2020
First Liens 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.0 3.4
Junior Liens 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
C & I 3.5 1.9 4.5 0.0 19.0
CRE 1.4 1.0 1.9 0.0 10.0
Credit Cards 4.4 0.3 8.2 0.0 27.5
Other Consumer 1.5 0.8 1.9 0.0 6.9
Other Loans 1.6 0.6 2.6 0.0 11.1
All Loans 13.1 5.7 16.6 0.1 64.4
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for loss levels (in billions of dollars) across loan cate-
gories for DFAST 2016, DFAST 2017, DFAST 2018, DFAST 2019 and DFAST 2020.
2.3 Comparison Across Scenarios
As I noted earlier, DFAST 2014 was the first stress test to disclose loss projections
for both an adverse and severely adverse scenario. Before investigating predictability
across time, I compare results from the two scenarios.
Figuret 2.2 shows results for the 30 BHCs that participated in DFAST 2014.
For each BHC, I plot the severely adverse loss rate on the vertical scale and the
adverse loss rate on the horizontal scale. Loss rates are measured in percent. In
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Year Category Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
2009
First Liens 7.7 8.1 2.8 3.4 11.9
Junior Liens 13.2 13.2 4.6 6.3 21.2
C&I 6.8 5.8 4.8 1.2 22.8
CRE 15.2 10.9 11.9 5.5 45.2
Credit Cards 22.6 22.3 5.4 17.4 37.9
All Loans 7.9 8.7 3.7 0.4 14.3
2012
First Liens 6.3 7.1 2.8 0.0 9.5
Junior Liens 12.5 12.1 3.3 7.8 21.1
C&I 6.5 7.4 3.2 0.0 10.9
CRE 6.5 5.6 4.3 2.1 20.1
Credit Cards 17.7 18.5 3.4 10.0 22.4
Other Consumer 5.3 3.7 5.3 0.0 23.4
Other Loans 2.4 2.5 1.3 0.0 4.7
All Loans 6.5 7.3 3.2 0.9 11.4
2013
First Liens 6.1 6.3 2.6 0.6 10.3
Junior Liens 10.3 9.7 3.6 6.1 21.1
C&I 8.8 6.5 10.5 0.0 49.8
CRE 8.7 8.0 2.9 4.8 18.3
Credit Cards 17.2 17.3 2.8 12.0 22.2
Other Consumer 5.0 4.1 4.2 0.0 16.5
Other Loans 2.1 1.8 0.9 0.8 4.5
All Loans 6.6 6.7 2.8 2.0 13.2
2014
First Liens 4.6 4.9 2.0 1.0 7.5
Junior Liens 9.0 9.9 2.7 4.8 13.5
C&I 6.2 5.4 2.2 3.8 11.4
CRE 9.5 8.9 4.7 4.8 26.2
Credit Cards 15.6 16.2 2.7 10.6 20.5
Other Consumer 4.5 3.9 3.6 0.0 14.0
Other Loans 2.6 2.6 1.0 1.0 4.5
All Loans 5.9 5.4 2.6 1.6 11.8
2015
First Liens 3.5 3.1 2.2 0.0 12.5
Junior Liens 7.3 6.8 4.3 0.0 22.3
C & I 5.7 4.8 2.5 3.0 14.0
CRE 10.2 8.3 6.3 0.0 31.6
Credit Cards 9.6 12.7 6.5 0.0 18.5
Other Consumer 6.6 5.8 4.4 0.6 17.2
Other Loans 3.2 2.7 2.2 0.0 12.7
All Loans 5.8 5.0 2.2 2.3 12.2
Table 2.3: Summary statistics for loss rates (in percent) across loan categories for
SCAP 2009, CCAR 2012, DFAST 2013, DFAST 2014 and DFAST 2015.
most cases, this gives us seven points for each bank, corresponding to the seven loan
categories used to report loss projections. Some banks have little or no lending in
some categories, resulting in fewer than seven points.
The results are striking. Across all 30 banks, I see a nearly perfect linear relation-
ship between the losses in the two scenarios. This visual impression is quantified in
Table 2.5, which shows the results of bank-specific regressions of the form
SevereLossRateb,c = Interceptb + Slopeb × AdverseLossRateb,c, (2.1)
where the intercept and slope depend on the bank b but not on the loan category c.
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Year Category Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
2016
First Liens 4.7 3.4 8.3 0.0 50.1
Junior Liens 6.7 6.3 3.5 0.0 16.3
C & I 6.5 5.5 2.7 2.6 15.5
CRE 7.4 6.8 3.6 0.0 22.9
Credit Cards 10.4 12.8 6.8 0.0 19.3
Other Consumer 6.8 6.1 4.1 0.6 16.5
Other Loans 3.9 3.7 1.8 1.2 9.4
All Loans 5.9 5.6 2.1 1.9 12.4
2017
First Liens 3.6 2.2 8.7 0.0 52.3
Junior Liens 4.5 4.5 2.1 0.0 10.4
C & I 6.8 6.0 2.5 3.4 13.8
CRE 7.3 7.4 2.7 0.0 15.5
Credit Cards 10.2 13.1 6.6 0.0 20.3
Other Consumer 6.5 6.2 4.1 0.0 17.5
Other Loans 4.1 3.5 2.3 0.0 11.1
All Loans 5.9 5.5 2.3 2.5 13.0
2018
First Liens 3.8 2.6 7.6 0.0 46.9
Junior Liens 5.0 5.1 3.0 0.0 14.8
C & I 8.2 7.2 4.4 0.0 24.4
CRE 8.3 8.2 3.3 0.0 18.8
Credit Cards 11.3 13.9 6.6 0.0 21.2
Other Consumer 7.0 5.9 4.4 0.6 18.0
Other Loans 4.1 4.3 1.7 0.6 7.8
All Loans 6.4 6.1 2.7 0.6 14.2
2019
First Liens 2.5 1.5 5.1 0.0 22.9
Junior Liens 3.1 3.3 2.4 0.0 8.7
C & I 7.2 6.0 5.1 0.0 22.6
CRE 6.8 6.9 2.8 0.0 14.2
Credit Cards 10.6 15.1 8.4 0.0 23.0
Other Consumer 6.9 6.5 4.9 0.6 14.0
Other Loans 3.4 3.1 1.7 0.6 6.3
All Loans 5.4 4.7 3.3 0.6 15.1
2020
First Liens 2.3 1.7 4.3 0.0 25.9
Junior Liens 3.7 3.8 2.4 0.0 10.0
C & I 8.0 6.7 4.3 0.0 20.9
CRE 6.8 6.3 3.7 0.0 20.9
Credit Cards 14.6 18.1 8.1 0.0 26.4
Other Consumer 8.2 7.1 5.1 0.6 17.3
Other Loans 4.2 4.0 2.0 0.6 11.1
All Loans 6.4 5.7 3.3 0.9 17.0
Table 2.4: Summary statistics for loss rates (in percent) across loan categories for
DFAST 2016, DFAST 2017, DFAST 2018, DFAST 2019 and DFAST 2020.
The average R2 across the 30 BHCs is 0.96. The slopes vary by bank but are mostly
between 1.1 and 1.3. Few of the intercepts are significantly different from zero.
To put these patterns in perspective, consider that each scenario in DFAST 2014
is defined by the paths over nine quarters of 28 economic variables, so each scenario
is a 9× 28 = 252 dimensional object. This leaves a lot of room for differences across
scenarios. I might expect different loan categories to respond differently to two such
scenarios, given the complexity of the model. Yet the results say otherwise. Consider
Bank of America, for example. The results say that its projected losses across all
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of loss rates across all loan categories and all banks in DFAST
2012–2020. The continuous curve in the figures is a gamma density estimated from
the 2012–2020 data.
seven loan categories are a little more than 25 percent worse in one scenario than the
other, effectively reducing stress severity to a single dimension.
Figure 2.3 shows corresponding results grouped by asset category and pooled
across banks for DFAST 2014. For the seven loan categories, I show loss rates rather
than dollar losses to put BHCs of different sizes on a consistent scale. In the lower
right panel of the chart, I have included trading and counterparty losses. These are
reported in billions of dollars because the Federal Reserve does not report rates for
this category. Only eight of the 18 BHCs participate in this part of the stress test,
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Figure 2.2: The plot for each BHC shows the severely adverse loss rate on the vertical
scale and the adverse loss rate on the horizontal scale. Loss rates are in percent.
Values shown are for DFAST 2014.
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and these are all among the largest BHCs, so size discrepancy is less of a concern in
this category.
Again, I see a striking linear relationship between the two scenarios across all
categories. The corresponding regression is now
SevereLossRateb,c = Interceptc + Slopec × AdverseLossRateb,c, (2.2)
with coefficients that depend on the loan category c but not the bank b. Table 2.6
quantifies the pattern in the scatter plots. The results are surprising, even given the
results of Figure 2.2: because the banks have different slopes and intercepts, there is
no reason to expect that pooling the bank-specific linear relationships would produce
category-specific linear relationships in loss rates. I repeat this exercise for DFAST
2015–2019 and present the results of the regression in Tables 2.5 – 2.16. Recall that
loss rates for the adverse scenario in DFAST 2020 was not made public. The strong
linear relationships continue to hold with a few exceptions, notably Discover Financial
Services in DFAST 2018 where the outlier in Commercial Real Estate loans drives
the value of R2 down to 0.53. Once the outlier is removed, the R2 increases to 0.83.
These patterns are puzzling. I would expect to see a more complex relationship
between adverse and severely adverse outcomes, reflecting a nonlinear response of
bank portfolios to economic shocks. The patterns appear to be an artifact of the
stress testing process rather than an accurate reflection of potential bank losses.
They suggest an opportunity to get more information out of the stress tests through
greater diversity in the scenarios used.
In what follows, I confine myself to the predictability of stress losses in the severely
adverse scenario.
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Bank Holding Company Slopeb Interceptb R
2
Ally Financial Inc. 1.31∗∗∗ 0.56 0.96
American Express Company 1.25∗∗ 0.33 0.96
Bank of America Corporation 1.25∗∗∗ 0.65 0.97
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1.31∗∗∗ 0.25 0.97
BB&T Corporation 1.19∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 1.00
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 1.24∗∗∗ 0.50 0.99
BMO Financial Corp. 1.20∗∗∗ 0.66 0.97
Capital One Financial Corporation 1.08∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 0.99
Citigroup Inc. 1.12∗∗∗ 1.48 0.96
Comerica Incorporated 1.02∗∗∗ 1.74 0.87
Discover Financial Services 0.98∗∗∗ 2.35∗ 0.97
Fifth Third Bancorp 1.25∗∗∗ 0.34 0.99
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.21∗∗ 1.62 0.79
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1.15∗∗∗ 1.05 0.97
Huntington Banchsares Incorporated 0.89∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗ 0.91
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1.15∗∗∗ 1.49 0.93
KeyCorp 1.18∗∗∗ 0.60 0.98
M&T Bank Corporation 1.18∗∗∗ 0.62∗ 0.99
Morgan Stanley 1.39∗∗∗ 0.12 0.99
Northern Trust Corporation 1.04∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗ 0.98
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1.24∗∗∗ 0.62 0.98
RBS Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 1.16∗∗∗ 0.73 0.99
Regions Financial Corporation 1.23∗∗∗ 0.61 0.98
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 1.16∗∗∗ 0.94∗ 0.99
State Street Corporation 1.64∗∗∗ -0.13 1.00
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 1.20∗∗∗ 0.66 0.98
U.S. Bancorp 1.22∗∗∗ 0.69 0.97
UnionBanCal Corporation 1.09∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 0.97
Wells Fargo & Company 1.11∗∗∗ 1.62∗ 0.96
Zions Bancorporation 1.14∗∗∗ 1.12∗ 0.98
Table 2.5: Results of regression (2.1) by bank holding company of DFAST 2014
severely adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Category Slopec Interceptc R
2
First Liens 1.22∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.90
Junior Liens 1.23∗∗∗ 0.51 0.95
C &I 1.30∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.98
CRE 1.02∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗ 0.94
Credit Cards 1.28∗∗∗ -0.71 0.97
Other Consumer 1.14∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 1.00
Other Loans 1.51∗∗∗ 0.02 0.97
All Loans 1.15∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 0.96
Table 2.6: Results of regression (2.2) by loan category of DFAST 2014 severely adverse
loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the
10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
53
Bank Holding Company Slopeb Interceptb R
2
Ally Financial Inc. 1.68∗∗∗ −0.39 0.95
American Express Company 1.22∗∗∗ 0.15 0.99
Bank of America Corporation 1.29∗∗∗ 0.83 0.95
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1.38∗∗∗ 0.38 0.95
BB&T Corporation 1.21∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 0.98
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 1.25∗∗∗ 0.76 0.93
BMO Financial Corp. 1.20∗∗∗ 0.99 0.94
Capital One Financial Corporation 1.14∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 0.99
Citigroup Inc. 1.12∗∗∗ 1.70 0.93
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 1.25∗∗∗ 0.75 0.93
Comerica Incorporated 1.34∗∗∗ 0.70 0.88
Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation 1.73∗∗∗ −0.38 0.98
Discover Financial Services 1.61∗∗∗ −2.09 0.91
Fifth Third Bancorp 1.40∗∗∗ 0.18 0.95
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.74∗∗∗ −0.47 0.97
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1.08∗∗∗ 1.69∗ 0.98
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 1.20∗∗∗ 0.70 0.98
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1.22∗∗∗ 1.30 0.90
KeyCorp 1.17∗∗∗ 1.00 0.96
M&T Bank Corporation 1.17∗∗∗ 0.97∗ 0.98
Morgan Stanley 1.83∗∗∗ −0.32 1.00
MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation 1.19∗∗∗ 1.39∗ 0.95
Northern Trust Corporation 1.28∗∗∗ 0.81 0.97
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1.30∗∗∗ 0.64 0.96
Regions Financial Corporation 1.36∗∗∗ 0.29 0.93
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 1.20∗∗∗ 1.03 0.98
State Street Corporation 1.74∗∗∗ −0.07 1.00
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 1.24∗∗∗ 0.66 0.97
U.S. Bancorp 1.26∗∗∗ 0.95 0.95
Wells Fargo & Company 1.14∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 0.96
Zions Bancorporation 1.14∗∗∗ 1.46 0.97
Table 2.7: Results of regression (2.1) by bank holding company of DFAST 2015
severely adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Category Slopec Interceptc R
2
First Liens 1.20∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.99
Junior Liens 1.17∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 0.95
C & I 1.34∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.95
CRE 1.73∗∗∗ −0.05 1.00
Credit Cards 1.24∗∗∗ 0.05 1.00
Other Consumer 1.21∗∗∗ 0.22 0.99
Other Loans 1.82∗∗∗ −0.12∗ 0.99
All Loans 1.16∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.98
Table 2.8: Results of regression (2.2) by loan category of DFAST 2015 severely adverse
loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the
10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Bank Holding Company Slopeb Interceptb R
2
Ally Financial Inc. 1.55∗∗∗ 0.16 0.97
American Express Company 1.21∗∗∗ 0.47 0.97
BancWest Corporation 1.11∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗ 0.97
Bank of America Corporation 1.22∗∗∗ 1.20 0.94
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1.28∗∗∗ 0.88 0.90
BB&T Corporation 1.20∗∗∗ 1.33 0.94
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 1.16∗∗∗ 1.40 0.93
BMO Financial Corp. 1.14∗∗∗ 1.49∗ 0.94
Capital One Financial Corporation 1.18∗∗∗ 1.14∗ 0.99
Citigroup Inc. 1.05∗∗∗ 2.41∗ 0.87
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 1.14∗∗∗ 1.32 0.93
Comerica Incorporated 1.22∗∗∗ 1.14 0.88
Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation 1.49∗∗∗ 0.43 0.79
Discover Financial Services 1.49∗∗ 0.20 0.66
Fifth Third Bancorp 1.34∗∗∗ 0.92 0.88
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.04∗∗∗ 2.07∗ 0.99
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1.07∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗ 0.97
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 1.18∗∗∗ 1.16∗ 0.96
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1.25∗∗∗ 1.32∗ 0.94
KeyCorp 1.14∗∗∗ 1.41∗ 0.94
M&T Bank Corporation 1.10∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗ 0.96
Morgan Stanley 1.48∗∗∗ 0.40 0.92
MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation 1.18∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 0.96
Northern Trust Corporation 1.29∗∗∗ 1.15 0.96
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1.23∗∗∗ 1.03 0.91
Regions Financial Corporation 1.28∗∗∗ 1.05 0.91
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 1.25∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗ 0.99
State Street Corporation 2.06∗∗∗ −0.13 0.95
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 1.24∗∗∗ 0.97∗ 0.97
TD Group US Holdings LLC 1.15∗∗∗ 1.68 0.93
U.S. Bancorp 1.23∗∗∗ 1.49 0.89
Wells Fargo & Company 1.12∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗ 0.95
Zions Bancorporation 1.15∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗ 0.97
Table 2.9: Results of regression (2.1) by bank holding company of DFAST 2016
severely adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Category Slopec Interceptc R
2
First Liens 1.06∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.00
Junior Liens 1.28∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.96
C & I 1.32∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.96
CRE 2.16∗∗∗ 0.16 0.98
Credit Cards 1.27∗∗∗ 0.10 1.00
Other Consumer 1.22∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.98
Other Loans 1.72∗∗∗ 0.04 0.99
All Loans 1.17∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 0.97
Table 2.10: Results of regression (2.2) by loan category of DFAST 2016 severely
adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Bank Holding Company Slopeb Interceptb R
2
Ally Financial Inc. 1.50∗∗∗ 0.18 0.99
American Express Company 1.35∗∗∗ −0.01 1.00
BancWest Corporation 1.15∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 0.95
Bank of America Corporation 1.25∗∗∗ 1.08 0.92
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1.34∗∗∗ 0.52 0.89
BB&T Corporation 1.23∗∗∗ 0.98∗ 0.97
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 1.18∗∗∗ 1.27 0.96
BMO Financial Corp. 1.14∗∗∗ 1.39 0.92
Capital One Financial Corporation 1.19∗∗∗ 1.20∗ 0.98
CIT Group Inc. 1.35∗∗∗ 0.83 0.91
Citigroup Inc. 1.08∗∗∗ 1.96∗ 0.93
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 1.22∗∗∗ 1.02 0.92
Comerica Incorporated 1.14∗∗∗ 1.06 0.89
Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation 1.62∗∗∗ −0.13 0.82
Discover Financial Services 1.17∗∗ 1.85 0.73
Fifth Third Bancorp 1.39∗∗∗ 0.65 0.91
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.02∗∗∗ 2.06∗ 0.99
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1.14∗∗∗ 1.39∗ 0.95
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 1.21∗∗∗ 1.07∗ 0.97
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1.24∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.98
KeyCorp 1.24∗∗∗ 1.03 0.87
M&T Bank Corporation 1.19∗∗∗ 1.11 0.94
Morgan Stanley 1.49∗∗∗ 0.26 0.96
MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation 1.13∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗ 0.97
Northern Trust Corporation 1.21∗∗∗ 1.12 0.95
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1.27∗∗∗ 0.80 0.96
Regions Financial Corporation 1.29∗∗∗ 0.86 0.93
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 1.27∗∗∗ 0.92 0.98
State Street Corporation 1.88∗∗∗ −0.14 0.95
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 1.27∗∗∗ 0.91 0.96
TD Group US Holdings LLC 1.18∗∗∗ 1.08∗ 0.98
U.S. Bancorp 1.24∗∗∗ 1.22 0.93
Wells Fargo & Company 1.16∗∗∗ 1.56∗ 0.95
Zions Bancorporation 1.21∗∗∗ 1.31 0.95
Table 2.11: Results of regression (2.1) by bank holding company of DFAST 2017
severely adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Category Slopec Interceptc R
2
First Liens 1.04∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1.00
Junior Liens 1.18∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.94
C & I 1.37∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.98
CRE 2.08∗∗∗ 0.07 0.98
Credit Cards 1.28∗∗∗ 0.07 1.00
Other Consumer 1.26∗∗∗ 0.23 0.99
Other Loans 1.52∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.99
All Loans 1.21∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.97
Table 2.12: Results of regression (2.2) by loan category of DFAST 2017 severely
adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Bank Holding Company Slopeb Interceptb R
2
Ally Financial Inc. 1.52∗∗∗ 0.51 0.94
American Express Company 1.30∗∗∗ 0.33 0.98
Bank of America Corporation 1.21∗∗∗ 1.77 0.90
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1.37∗∗ 1.15∗ 0.73
Barclays US LLC 1.18∗∗∗ 1.06 0.97
BB&T Corporation 1.21∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗ 0.94
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 1.11∗∗∗ 2.41 0.86
BMO Financial Corp. 1.19∗∗∗ 1.80 0.87
BNP Paribas USA, Inc. 1.23∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗ 0.94
Capital One Financial Corporation 1.20∗∗∗ 1.75∗ 0.96
Citigroup Inc. 0.91∗∗ 3.50∗ 0.71
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 1.16∗∗∗ 1.94 0.80
Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc. 1.27∗∗∗ −0.01 1.00
DB USA Corporation 1.49∗∗ 0.96 0.65
Discover Financial Services 1.07∗ 4.33 0.53
Fifth Third Bancorp 1.43∗∗∗ 1.13 0.87
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.11∗∗∗ 2.91∗ 0.97
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1.08∗∗∗ 2.59∗ 0.83
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 1.29∗∗∗ 1.38 0.94
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1.23∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗ 0.96
KeyCorp 1.23∗∗∗ 1.58 0.85
M&T Bank Corporation 1.22∗∗∗ 1.90 0.87
Morgan Stanley 1.66∗∗∗ 0.66 0.89
MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation 1.00∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗ 0.95
Northern Trust Corporation 1.20∗∗∗ 2.03 0.85
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1.30∗∗∗ 1.20 0.92
RBC USA Holdco Corporation 1.14∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗ 0.91
Regions Financial Corporation 1.23∗∗∗ 1.77 0.87
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 1.11∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗ 0.97
State Street Corporation 1.89∗∗∗ 0.06 0.89
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 1.24∗∗∗ 1.69 0.90
TD Group US Holdings LLC 1.20∗∗∗ 1.59 0.96
UBS Americas Holding LLC 1.37∗∗∗ 0.99 0.95
U.S. Bancorp 1.24∗∗∗ 1.89 0.87
Wells Fargo & Company 1.11∗∗∗ 2.44∗ 0.87
Table 2.13: Results of regression (2.1) by bank holding company of DFAST 2018
severely adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Category Slopec Interceptc R
2
First Liens 1.13∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 0.99
Junior Liens 1.70∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.87
C & I 1.25∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 0.96
CRE 2.50∗∗∗ 0.35 0.93
Credit Cards 1.34∗∗∗ 0.11 1.00
Other Consumer 1.23∗∗∗ 0.22 0.99
Other Loans 1.77∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.99
All Loans 1.21∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 0.95
Table 2.14: Results of regression (2.2) by loan category of DFAST 2018 severely
adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Figure 2.3: The plot for each loan category shows the severely adverse loss rate on
the vertical scale and the adverse loss rate on the horizontal scale. Loss rates are in
percent. Trading and counterparty losses are in billions of dollars. Values shown are
for DFAST 2014.
Bank Holding Company Slopeb Interceptb R
2
Bank of America Corporation 1.33∗∗∗ 0.90 0.97
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1.28∗∗∗ 0.97 0.87
Barclays US LLC 1.21∗∗∗ 0.85 0.98
Capital One Financial Corporation 1.25∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗ 0.99
Citigroup Inc. 1.16∗∗∗ 1.54 0.91
Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc. 1.25∗∗∗ 0.00 1.00
DB USA Corporation 1.40∗∗ 0.59 0.71
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.07∗∗∗ 2.86 0.85
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1.26∗∗∗ 1.46 0.90
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1.36∗∗∗ 0.64∗ 0.99
Morgan Stanley 1.73∗∗∗ 0.10 0.86
Northern Trust Corporation 1.18∗∗∗ 1.27∗ 0.95
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1.40∗∗∗ 0.70 0.96
State Street Corporation 1.83∗∗∗ 0.01 0.90
TD Group US Holdings LLC 1.28∗∗∗ 0.84 0.99
UBS Americas Holding LLC 1.44∗∗∗ 0.59 0.98
U.S. Bancorp 1.31∗∗∗ 0.96 0.95
Wells Fargo & Company 1.27∗∗∗ 1.15 0.95
Table 2.15: Results of regression (2.1) by bank holding company of DFAST 2019
severely adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Category Slopec Interceptc R
2
First Liens 1.18∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 1.00
Junior Liens 1.46∗∗∗ 0.19 0.96
C & I 1.24∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.98
CRE 2.50∗∗∗ −0.02 0.97
Credit Cards 1.37∗∗∗ 0.11 1.00
Other Consumer 1.21∗∗∗ 0.12 1.00
Other Loans 1.70∗∗∗ −0.17 0.99
All Loans 1.32∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.98
Table 2.16: Results of regression (2.2) by loan category of DFAST 2019 severely
adverse loss rates versus adverse loss rates. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
T Slopec Interceptc R
2
2013 0.93∗∗∗ 0.02 0.93
2014 0.97∗∗∗ 0.00 0.94
2015 0.95∗∗∗ 0.01 0.96
2016 0.97∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.95
2017 0.99∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.95
2018 0.99∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.98
2019 0.99∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.96
2020 1.00∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.98
Table 2.17: Results of regression (2.3) for all DFAST tests from T = 2013 to T = 2020.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level
(***).
2.4 Predictability in Loss Levels
In this section, I examine the relationship between the projected losses ST and ST−1
from stress tests run in years T and T − 1, respectively. To do so, I need to limit
myself to those BHCs that participated in both the years.
I start by pooling losses across all banks (that are common to years T and T − 1)
and all loan categories. Because the BHCs vary widely in size, I take logarithms of
the losses to put them on a more consistent scale. I run the following regression:
log10(S
b,c
T ) = InterceptT + SlopeT × log10(S
b,c
T−1). (2.3)
I run the regressions from T = 2013 to T = 2020. I summarize the results in
Table 2.17.
Table 2.17 clearly shows that losses by bank and loan category are highly persistent
from one year to the next. In every case, the R2 is greater than 0.90 and is generally
increasing with time, suggesting a trend towards increasing predictability. The slopes
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are all highly significant and close to, but less than one, suggesting that losses are
decreasing with time and the intercepts are all close to zero. Table 2.17 pools losses
across all banks and categories. To examine individual loan types, I run the following
regression for each category c using losses for each bank b:
log10(S
b,c
T ) = Interceptc + Slopec × log10(S
b,c
T−1). (2.4)
I run the regressions from T = 2013 and T = 2020. Tables 2.18–2.20 summarize the
results. The R2 is very high in almost all cases. The intercepts are close to zero, and
the slopes are close to one. The results indicate a high degree of predictability in a
bank’s projected losses in an individual loan category from one year to the next.
Category
T = 2013 T = 2014 T = 2015
Slope Intercept R2 Slope Intercept R2 Slope Intercept R2
First Liens 0.98∗∗∗ −0.02 0.96 1.03∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ 0.93 0.82∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.95
Junior Liens 0.84∗∗∗ −0.08 0.85 1.13∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ 0.94 0.93∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.99
C & I 0.83∗∗∗ 0.08 0.84 1.04∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.95 1.01∗∗∗ 0.03 0.95
CRE 1.05∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.93 0.93∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.95 0.85∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.89
Credit Cards 0.96∗∗∗ 0.03 0.99 0.99∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 1.00 1.01∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.99
Other Consumer 0.89∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.94 1.04∗∗∗ −0.03 0.97 0.91∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.98
Other Loans 0.89∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ 0.89 0.92∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.75 1.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.96
All Loans 0.82∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.93 0.99∗∗∗ −0.01 0.98 0.91∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.98
Table 2.18: Regression estimates for log losses on lagged log losses, by loan category,
as in (2.4) for T = 2013, 2014 and 2015. Asterisks indicate results statistically signif-
icantly different from zero at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***).
Category
T = 2016 T = 2017 T = 2018
Slope Intercept R2 Slope Intercept R2 Slope Intercept R2
First Liens 0.88∗∗∗ −0.02 0.89 0.88∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.80 0.97∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.92
Junior Liens 0.97∗∗∗ −0.05 0.94 0.82∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ 0.87 0.92∗∗∗ −0.03 0.95
C & I 0.98∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.96 1.03∗∗∗ 0.02 0.98 1.00∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.98
CRE 0.96∗∗∗ −0.05∗ 0.93 0.97∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.96 0.97∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.96
Credit Cards 0.96∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.99 1.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 1.00 1.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 1.00
Other Consumer 0.94∗∗∗ 0.04 0.94 1.04∗∗∗ 0.02 0.98 0.86∗∗∗ 0.02 0.94
Other Loans 0.97∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.91 0.90∗∗∗ 0.04 0.91 1.02∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.97
All Loans 0.98∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.96 0.99∗∗∗ 0.02 0.98 1.00∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.99
Table 2.19: Regression estimates for log losses on lagged log losses, by loan category,
as in (2.4) for T = 2016, 2017 and 2018. Asterisks indicate results statistically signif-
icantly different from zero at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***).
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Figure 2.4: Projected stress loan losses across the SCAP 2009, the CCAR 2012, and
DFAST 2013 – 2020 for Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co
and Wells Fargo & Company. The chart shows loan losses only and does not include
trading and counterparty losses.
Category
T = 2019 T = 2020
Slope Intercept R2 Slope Intercept R2
First Liens 0.91∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.98 1.00∗∗∗ 0.01 0.93
Junior Liens 0.72∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ 0.97 0.92∗∗∗ −0.05 0.95
C & I 1.01∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.99 1.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.97
CRE 0.96∗∗∗ −0.08∗ 0.95 0.94∗∗∗ −0.01 0.98
Credit Cards 0.92∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.99 0.89∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 1.00
Other Consumer 0.88∗∗∗ 0.06 0.95 0.96∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.98
Other Loans 0.99∗∗∗ −0.04 0.97 0.99∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.99
All Loans 0.99∗∗∗ −0.03 0.99 1.00∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 1.00
Table 2.20: Regression estimates for log losses on lagged log losses, by loan category,
as in (2.4) for T = 2019 and 2020. Asterisks indicate results statistically significantly
different from zero at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***).
Figure 2.4 summarizes projected stress loan losses from 2009 SCAP to DFAST 20
for the four largest banks – Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan
Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Company. The chart shows a striking convergence
for three of the four banks in the projected loss levels. The loss levels for JPMorgan
Chase & Co. start diverging around 2017 in an increasing fashion. This is consistent
with news reported that JPMorgan Chase & Co. had to resubmit their capital plans
in 2019 after failing the first time (see Lang [44]). The chart shows loan losses only
and does not include trading and counterparty losses.
61
2.5 Predictability in Loss Rates
The projected loss rate for a given bank in a given category is the corresponding
projected loss level divided by the pre-stress value of the bank’s assets in that category.
Loss rates are more sensitive to small changes than are loss levels, particularly when
the denominator is small. For example, Goldman Sachs’s C&I loss rate in DFAST
2013 is huge at 49.8%. But its projected loss in that category is only $1.4 billion,
below the median projected C&I loss that year and much smaller than Goldman
Sachs’s projected trading and counterparty loss of $24.9 billion.
Tables 2.21 and 2.22 show the correlation in loss rates across consecutive years
broken down by loan category across all BHCs that participated in both years. All
Loans corresponds to the overall loss rate which is the size-weighted average of a
BHC’s loss rates across the seven loan categories. These overall rates are included
in the Federal Reserve’s CCAR and DFAST reports. I find a general trend towards
increased predictability across the years. One notable exception is the Commercial
Real Estate loan 2019–2020 correlation of −0.15, which is primarily driven by the
Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc. without which the correlation increases to 0.78.
The correlations vary widely across categories, which makes the predictability of
the overall rates in Table 2.21 even more surprising. The pattern suggests that banks’
overall loss rates are much more stable than their loss rates in individual categories;
higher loss rate projections for a bank in one category tend to be offset by lower
projections in another category.
Category 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016
First Liens 0.53 0.70 0.84 0.25
Junior Liens 0.10 0.41 0.94 0.85
C & I 0.57 0.46 0.91 0.91
CRE 0.80 0.88 0.90 0.60
Credit Cards 0.66 0.98 0.57 0.97
Other Consumer 0.78 0.98 0.66 0.98
Other 0.17 0.55 0.42 0.64
All Loans 0.86 0.96 0.95 0.89
Table 2.21: Correlations in loss rates for consecutive years by loan category from
T = 2012 to T = 2016.
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Category 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020
First Liens 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Junior Liens 0.55 0.86 0.58 0.77
C & I 0.93 0.92 0.99 0.95
CRE 0.85 0.93 0.74 −0.15
Credit Cards 0.56 0.96 0.98 0.41
Other Consumer 0.80 0.82 0.97 0.99
Other 0.49 0.65 0.93 0.91
All Loans 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99
Table 2.22: Correlations in loss rates for consecutive years by loan category from
T = 2016 to T = 2020.
I have experimented with using other variables to forecast loss rates, including
actual charge-offs reported by the BHCs, stock returns and stock return volatility for
individual BHCs. In some cases, actual charge-offs appear to have some forecasting
power: BHCs reporting higher loan losses in the prior year often experience higher
loss rate projections in the subsequent stress test. However, none of the variables I
tested adds much in forecasting stress loss rates compared with using a bank’s prior
year’s stress loss rate.
2.6 Stock Market Reaction to Stress Test Results
In this section, I examine the stock market’s response to the Federal Reserve’s an-
nouncement of the DFAST results. The stock market’s response is a measure of the
informativeness of the results. I carry out this analysis for the banks that participated
in consecutive rounds of stress tests and are publically traded.
Peristiani, Morgan, and Savino [49] analyze the market’s response to the SCAP,
the first of the Fed’s stress tests. They find that the results of the SCAP were highly
informative for the banks that were found to require additional capital but not for
the banks that “passed” the stress test. Glasserman and Wang [31] find a significant
correlation between the value of the SCAP’s government backstop and the market’s
response to the announcement of the terms of the program.
The DFAST results were always announced at the end of the respective business
63
day. I evaluate the stock market’s response by calculating the return for each bank
from its closing price on the date of announcement to its closing price on the next
business day. To remove the overall effect of the market on that day, for each bank I
run a regression
BankReturnb,t = αb + βbMarketReturnt (2.5)
using daily returns for one year prior to the date of the announcement and using the
CRSP value-weighted index for the market return. The unexpected component of
the stock market response for each bank is the difference
ηb,T = BankReturnb,T − (αb + βbMarketReturnT ) (2.6)
evaluated on the next business day after the date of the announcement. For example,
DFAST 2014 was announced on March 20 and so the impact of the stock market is
evaluated on March 21, 2014.
I compare the unexpected returns ηb with the DFAST stress test results in two
ways. First, I measure the correlation ρoverall between the unexpected returns and the
overall loss rates reported. Next, I form a simple forecast of the stress test results.
Suppose I intend to estimate the stock market reaction for year T . Then, I regress
overall loss rates announced in year T − 1 on loss rates announced in year T − 2 to
estimate a0 and a1 in the equation
LossRateb,T−1 = a0 + a1×LossRateb,T−2 (2.7)
where b indexes the BHCs that have participated in all three rounds of stress tests.
I use this equation to forecast the loss rates in year T as
̂LossRateb,T = a0 + a1×LossRateb,T−1 (2.8)
I take the differences between the actual and predicted loss rates,
εb,T = LossRateb,T − ̂LossRateb,T (2.9)
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as the unexpected component in the stress test results and then measure the cor-
relation ρunexpected with the abnormal stock returns calculated in equation (2.6). I
measure the statistical significance of the correlation in terms of the p−value of the
F−test for the respective regression. I report the observed correlations in Table 2.23.
Year ρoverall ρunexpected
2014 −0.08 0.29
2015 0.00 0.18
2016 0.34∗ 0.32∗
2017 0.15 −0.16
2018 0.09 −0.02
2019 −0.39 −0.43∗
2020 −0.09 0.70∗∗∗
Table 2.23: The correlations of the unexpected stock returns on the day after
announcement and the announced overall and unexpected loss rates, ρoverall and
ρunexpected. Asterisks indicate results statistically significantly different from zero at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***).
The correlations observed in years 2014 and 2015 are very small and statistically
not significant. This is consistent with the view that the loss rates reported did not
inform the market. In both these years, I find that ρunexpected > 0 which is surprising:
if the unexpected losses were informative, I would expect them to be negatively
correlated with the excess returns. But the market likely forms a better forecast of
the overall results using additional current information not captured in my simple
forecast.
I observe a significant stock market impact in 2016 for both the overall and unex-
pected loss rate regressions. However, this may not necessarily imply that the effect
is solely due to the Federal Reserve’s stress test announcements because the results
of the Brexit Referendum were announced on the exact same day as the DFAST 2016
results, on June 23. One cannot ignore the effect of this major political event on the
observed correlations.
I see no statistically significant stock market reaction in the years 2017 and 2018.
However, for both these years I have ρunexpected smaller than ρoverall and negative,
which is consistent with the intuition outlined above.
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For both 2019 and 2020, I observe a statistically significant ρunexpected but a sta-
tistically insignificant ρoverall. However, this may not necessarily mean that the stock
market had a significant reaction to the stress test announcements. Recall that start-
ing in 2019, the Federal Reserve decided to move less-complex banks to a two-year
stress testing cycle. This has resulted in some data availability issues when it comes
to performing the regression (2.7). Consequently, I end up considering a much smaller
number of BHCs when evaluating the stock market impact, which could potentially
throw the significance of the observed correlation into question. This is somewhat
supported by the fact that ρoverall is not significant for both these years.
The Federal Reserve’s DFAST and CCAR announcements include much more
than the stress test results. For example, in 2014, the CCAR results were announced
a week after DFAST and the biggest surprise at the announcement was that Citigroup
had “failed” for shortcomings in its internal processes that were not directly related to
its projected stress losses. These other, simultaneous announcements make it difficult
to isolate the effect of the stress test results, but there is no indication of a significant
market reaction to these results.
2.7 Stock Market Reaction to Stress Test
Announcement
In this section, I try to ascertain the fixed effect of the Federal Reserve’s stress test
announcements on the stock and option market. This is in contrast to the previous
section where I examined the relationship between the stock market reaction and the
loss rates reported in the DFAST announcement. For this section, I follow the analysis
presented in Flannery, Hirtle and Kovner [28] and estimate the market reaction in
terms of abnormal return (AR), abnormal volume (AV) and change in the option
implied volatility (∆ VOL). However, in order to be consistent with Section 2.6 and
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compare results, I employ methodologies different from those in Flannery, Hirtle and
Kovner [28] to estimate these quantities. I extend the analysis in Flannery, Hirtle
and Kovner [28] to the years 2016 – 2020. In addition to the measures above, I follow
the methodology outlined in Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi [42] and calculate and report
the implied volatility slope difference (∆VOLSLOPE). I elaborate on the specifics of
the methodologies employed below.
2.7.1 Abnormal Return (AR)
I calculate the abnormal return ηb as before using regression (2.6) in Section 2.6 for
every participating bank b. AR is calculated as the average of ηb for all banks. I then
perform a t−test on this collection of abnormal returns to see if there is a statistically
significant effect of the announcement on the stock market returns.
2.7.2 Abnormal Volume (AV)
Let τ denote the date of the announcement. To calculate the abnormal volume (AV),
I first perform the regression
V olb,t = µb + νbMarketV olt (2.10)
for each bank b over the time window of one year prior to τ where V olb and V olMarket
are calculated as follows
V olb,t =
No. of shares of b traded on t
Total Outstanding Shares
MarketV olt =
Sum of all shares traded of CRSP constituents on t
Sum of total outstanding shares traded of CRSP constituents
The abnormal volume for bank b is then calculated as
εb = V olb,τ+1 − (µb + νbMarketV olτ+1) (2.11)
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AV is calculated as the average of εb for all banks. I then perform a t−test on this
collection of abnormal volumes to see if there is a statistically significant effect of the
announcement on the stock volume traded.
2.7.3 ∆VOL
I calculate the change of the implied volatility between the dates τ and τ + 1 for each
bank b. ∆VOL is the average of the changes in implied volatility. I perform a t−test
and report the values.
2.7.4 ∆VOLSLOPE
I follow the methodology outlined in Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi [42] to calculate
∆VOLSLOPE. I collect put options with option delta ∆ satisfying −0.5 < ∆ < −0.1
for each bank b on dates τ and τ + 1. I then perform the regressions
σb,t = κb,t + λb,t∆b,t
on the dates t = τ and t = τ + 1, where σb,t and ∆b,t are respectively the put option
implied volatility and the corresponding ∆ for bank b on date t. I then calculate
the difference λb,τ+1 − λb,τ for each bank b. ∆VOLSLOPE is the average of these
slope differences. I perform a t−test on slope differences and report the values. Since
the ∆ for put options is negative, a positive value of the slope difference indicates
that deep out-of-the-money put options were particularly expensive before the stress
test announcements indicating that investors were willing to pay a premium to hedge
against potential market downfall.
2.7.5 Results and Discussion
I calculate AR, AV, ∆VOL and ∆VOLSLOPE for all the stress test announcements
in the period 2009–2020. The results are summarized in Table 2.24.
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Test Name
AR
(%) AV
VOL
(%)
VOLSLOPE
(×10−2)
SCAP 2009 2.34 44.45 −4.05∗∗ −4.82
CCAR 2011 −1.68∗∗∗ 8.02 −3.79∗∗∗ −1.31
CCAR 2012 1.46∗∗ 19.50∗∗∗ −2.45 18.00
CCAR 2013 −0.13 −0.20 0.01 −0.07
DFAST 2013 0.59 3.69∗ −0.89∗∗∗ −2.52
CCAR 2014 −0.70∗∗ 2.22 −0.64∗∗∗ −2.00
DFAST 2014 0.09 7.67∗∗ 0.01 0.80
CCAR 2015 0.86∗∗∗ 2.25 −3.45 9.87
DFAST 2015 1.98∗∗∗ 1.02 0.47 −2.00
CCAR 2016 0.06 8.81∗∗∗ 2.00 3.07
DFAST 2016 −0.76∗ −1.46 10.51∗∗∗ 1.19
CCAR 2017 1.54∗∗∗ 1.86 −0.87∗∗∗ −7.58
DFAST 2017 0.26 −8.79∗∗∗ −1.56 11.00
CCAR 2018 −0.11 −0.28 1.51 −0.10
DFAST 2018 −0.55∗∗ −13.01∗∗ 4.49 −39.00
CCAR 2019 0.52 −12.47∗ −1.66∗∗∗ 1.34
DFAST 2019 −0.17 −9.30 0.80 −1.72
DFAST2020 −0.41 −18.22∗∗ 2.29 7.31
Pooled 0.09 0.26 0.21 −0.36
Table 2.24: The values of AR, AV, ∆VOL and ∆VOLSLOPE across all stress test
announcements in the period 2009–2020. Asterisks indicate results statistically sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***).
Overall, I find instances of stress test announcements having a signficant impact
on the stock market, but no general pattern seems to emerge for AR and AV. For AR,
the earlier stress test announcements in 2011 and 2012 seem to have a statistically
significant stock market impact while the more recent announcements of 2019 and
2020 have no significant impact. On the other hand, for recent years 2018 and 2019,
AV is statistially significant with several years in between where it isn’t. I see similar
behavior in terms of ∆VOL as well. The presence of statistically significant instances
is surprising. The announcement date for the stress tests is known well in advance.
It would seem that investors do not react to the new information provided by stress
announcements (as seen in the Section 2.6) but do react to the event itself. This
would suggest that most activity on those dates is driven by speculation.
However, the effect in terms of ∆VOLSLOPE is consistent over time. The re-
ported value of ∆VOLSLOPE is statistically insignificant for every single stress test
announcement so far. That means that investors do not anticipate the stress test
announcement to result in a significant market downfall. This is consistent with my
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finding in Section 2.6 that the stress test announcements do not seem to add any new
information to the market. Also, note that when I pool the observations across all
the stress test announcement dates, I find no overall significant impact on the market
for all the four measures. This too, is consistent with my finding in Section Section
2.6.
2.8 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the Federal Reserve’s bank stress tests suggest a trend toward greater
predictability. In this final section, I discuss implications and possible responses to
this trend. I see two primary options.
One option is to accept greater predictability as a consequence of the maturing of
the stress testing process. If bank portfolios change slowly, then their capital levels
should arguably change slowly as well. And a predictable process still has value: the
stress tests require banks to invest in resources for thorough risk assessment with
overall benefits for financial stability. The CCAR process includes much more than
stress testing, and the other dimensions of the CCAR review may take on greater
relative importance than the stress test over time.
The main concern with a routinized stress test is the danger that it will lead
banks to optimize their choices for a particular supervisory hurdle and implicitly
create new, harder to detect risks in doing so. This concern applies to any fixed
supervisory scheme, including one based on risk-weighted assets. (To counter this
effect, Glasserman and Kang [30] propose risk weights that adapt to changes in bank
portfolios.) One should not expect stress testing to be immune to this concern once
the element of surprise is lost. A further concern is that predictability in stress
testing may lead to pressures to weaken the process, given the costs involved in its
implementation.
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A second option is to resist the trend toward predictability. There are at least
three ways this might be done, in increasing order of difficulty. First, the adverse and
severely adverse scenarios required by DFAST could be differentiated qualitatively
to bring greater diversity to the stress testing process, even without increasing the
cost of the process. Second, the overall number of scenarios could be significantly
expanded to help plug holes inevitably left by just two or three scenarios. Third
and most ambitious, the stress testing process could be expanded, as discussed in
Bookstaber et al. [22], to include knock-on and feedback effects between institutions,
and interactions between solvency and liquidity, leading to a richer set of outcomes
than can be achieved through a fixed set of stress scenarios applied separately to each
bank. Such a process, though difficult to implement, would respond to changes in
the financial and economic environment and would be less likely to get stuck in a
predictable outcome.
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Appendix A
Network Interactions and the Social Value of Information
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1
The first-order condition of agent i’s problem implies that
Ei[θ]− ai +
∑
j 6=i
qijEi[aj] = 0. (A.1)
By definition, in any linear equilibrium, equilibrium actions are given by ai = αisi+βi
for all i, where αi and βi are constants that do not depend on the realization of signals.
Plugging this expression into the above equation implies that(
ρi − αi +
∑
j 6=i
qijrijαj
)
si +
(
−βi +
∑
j 6=i
qijβj
)
= 0
with the convention that rii = 1. In deriving the above, I am using the fact that
Ei[θ] = ρisi and Ei[aj] = αjrijsi + βj. Since the above equality has to hold for all
agents i and all realizations of si, it is therefore immediate that (I−Q)β = 0 and
that (I−Q ◦R)α = ρ.
Note that Assumption 1.1 then guarantees that I − Q is invertible. Therefore,
(I−Q)β = 0 implies that β = 0.
The proof is therefore complete once I show that I−Q ◦R is also invertible, as
this would imply that α = (I−Q ◦R)−1ρ. To this end, note that,
−|Q|k ≤ (Q ◦R)k ≤ |Q|k
76
element-wise for all positive integers k, where I am using the fact that the diagonal
elements of R are all equal to 1. Taking the limit k → ∞ of all sides of the above
inequality and using the fact that ρ(|Q|) < 1 (as guaranteed by Assumption 1.1) then
implies that limk→∞(Q ◦ R)k = 0. Thus, by Theorem 4.20 of Stewart [52], matrix
I−Q ◦R is invertible.
Proof of Corollary 1.3
Recall from Proposition 1.1 that the vector of equilibrium weights that agents as-
sign to their private signals is given by α = (I − Q ◦ R)−1ρ, where Q is the econ-
omy’s interaction matrix. In the proof of Proposition 1.1, I already established that
limk→∞(Q ◦R)k = 0. Thus, by Theorem 4.20 of Stewart [52],
α =
∞∑
k=0
(Q ◦R)kρ. (A.2)
Since Q, R, and ρ are element-wise non-negative, the above equation implies that α
is element-wise increasing in all off-diagonal elements of Q. This establishes part (b)
of the result.
Similarly, since matrices Q and R are element-wise positive, it follows that α is
element-wise increasing in ρi for all i. Thus equilibrium weights are increasing in
signal accuracies, establishing statement (a). Finally, since in addition ρ is element-
wise positive by assumption, the same equation also implies that α is element-wise
increasing in all elements of R, that is, the weight each agent assigns to her private
signal is increasing in signal commonalities. This establishes part (c) of the result.
Proof of Corollary 1.4
Define
L = [lij] = (I−Q ◦R)−1 = I +
∞∑
k=1
(Q ◦R)k (A.3)
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From Proposition 1.1, one can readily see the following:
dαi
dρj
= lij (A.4)
dαi
drjk
= qjkαklij + qkjαjlik (A.5)
for all players k. Suppose qjk ∈ (q̂, 0) for all j 6= k for some q̂ < 0. It is easy to
see from Equation (A.3) that lii = 1 + O(q̂) and lij = qijrij + O(q̂
2) for all j 6= i.
Thus for a value of q̂ sufficiently close to 0, from Equation (A.4), it is immediate that
dαi/dρi > 0 and dαi/dρj < 0 for all j 6= i. In other words, αi is increasing in ρi and
decreasing in ρj for all j 6= i. This establishes part (a) of the result.
To establish part (b), once again suppose qjk ∈ (q̂, 0) for all j 6= k for some
q̂ < 0. Note that αi = ρi + O(q̂) for all agents i. Therefore, from Equation (A.5),
I have dαi/drik = qikαklii + qkiαilik = qikρk + O(q̂
2) for all k 6= i and dαi/drjk =
qijqjkrijρk + qikqkjrikρj +O(q̂
3) for all j 6= k such that i /∈ {j, k}. Thus for a value of
q̂ sufficiently close to 0, it is immediate that dαi/drik < 0 and dαi/drjk > 0. In other
words, αi is decreasing in rik for all k 6= i and increasing in rjk for all j 6= k such that
i /∈ {j, k}.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Recall that the social welfare function in this economy is given by equation (1.6).
Therefore, the first-order condition with respect to agent i’s action is given by
Ei[θ]− a∗i +
∑
j 6=i
q∗ijEi[a∗j ] = 0. (A.6)
The first order conditions for the planner given by Equation (A.6) are identical in
structure to the equilbirium first order conditions given by Equation (A.1). Thus,
following the outline of the proof for Proposition 1.1, the planner admits a solution
of the form a∗i = α
∗
i si where α
∗ = I−Q∗ ◦R. Since the problem of constrained
efficiency posed in Definition 1.2 is concave, this is the unique constrained efficient
solution across all possible strategies.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3
First suppose Q = Q∗. Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 then imply that α = α∗ irrespective of
the value of R and ρ. Thus, the equilibrium is constrained efficient for all information
structures.
To prove the converse implication, suppose that the equilibrium is constrained
efficient for all information structures. Consequently, Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 imply
that
(I−Q ◦R)−1ρ = (I−Q∗ ◦R)−1ρ (A.7)
for all R and all ρ. Fix an arbitrary pair of agents i and j and consider the information
structure (R, ρ) in which (i) rkl = 0 for all agent pairs {k, l} 6= {i, j} and (ii) ρk = 0
for all k 6= i. Under such an information structure, agent i is the only agent with an
informative signal about the fundamental (ρi 6= 0) and agents i and j are the only
pairs of agents with non-zero informational commonality (rij = rji 6= 0). Note that
for this to be a valid information structure, the resulting covariance matrix in (1.2)
has to be positive semidefinite. It is easy to verify that the covariance matrix
Σ = σ2

1 ρ′
ρ R

has n−2 zero eigenvalues, one eigenvalue equal to 1, and a pair of eigenvalues given by
1±
√
ρ2i + r
2
ij. Therefore, as long as ρ
2
i + r
2
ij < 1, the resulting information structure
is a valid information structure. For this choice of information structure, equation
(A.7) implies that
ρi
1− qijqjir2ij
=
ρi
1− q∗ijq∗jir2ij
qjirijρi
1− qijqjir2ij
=
q∗jirijρi
1− q∗ijq∗jir2ij
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Since ρi 6= 0 and rij 6= 0 by assumption, the only way for the above two equations
to be satisfied simultaneously is that qij = q
∗
ij. Since the pair (i, j) was chosen
arbitrarily, this implies that qij = q
∗
ij for all pairs of agents i and j, thus guaranteeing
that Q = Q∗.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof of part (a) Recall from Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 that the equilibrium and
efficient weights on agents signals are given by α = (I − Q ◦ R)−1ρ and α∗ = (I −
Q∗ ◦R)−1ρ, respectively. Therefore,
α− α∗ =
[
∞∑
k=1
(Q ◦R)k −
∞∑
k=1
(Q∗ ◦R)k
]
ρ. (A.8)
Consider the limit as all pairwise commonalities converge to 0, i.e., rij ↓ 0 for all
i 6= j. In matrix notation, I have R ↓ I. Consequently,
lim
R↓I
(α− α∗)− ((Q−Q∗) ◦R) ρ = 0.
Therefore, in the limit, if Q > Q∗ element-wise, then agent i overreacts to her private
signal (i.e., αi > α
∗
i ), whereas she underreacts if the inequality is reversed. Since these
relationships hold strictly in the limit, there exists a r > 0 small enough such that
they are also satisfied if rij < r for all i 6= j.
Proof of part (b) Note that when R = 11′, I must necessarily have that ρi = ρ
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose rij ∈ (r, 1) for all i 6= j. A first order Taylor expansion
implies that α−α∗ = (α− α∗)|R=11′ +O (1− r) = ρ(b− b∗) +O (1− r). Thus, for a
value of r sufficiently close to 1, if bi > b
∗
i then agent i overreacts to their signal and
if bi < b
∗
i then agent i underreacts to their signal. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 1.5
Recall that when agents’ action profile is given by (a1, . . . , an), the social welfare in
the economy is given by equation (1.6). On the other hand, Proposition 1.1 implies
that agents’ equilibrium actions are given by ai = αisi, where α = (I −Q ◦R)−1ρ.
As a result, ex ante equilibrium social welfare is given by
E[W ] = σ2
n∑
i=1
αiρi −
1
2
σ2
n∑
i=1
α2i +
1
2
σ2
n∑
i,j=1
q∗ijαiαjrij = σ
2α′ρ− 1
2
σ2α′(I−Q∗ ◦R)α.
(A.9)
Furthermore, since by assumption the economy is efficient under all information struc-
tures, Proposition 1.3 implies that Q∗ = Q. Consequently, the ex ante social welfare
is given by
E[W ] =
1
2
σ2ρ′(I−Q ◦R)−1ρ, (A.10)
In the proof of Proposition 1.1, I established that limk→∞(Q ◦R)k = 0. Therefore,
by Theorem 4.20 of Stewart [52],
E[W ] =
1
2
σ2
∞∑
k=0
ρ′(Q ◦R)kρ. (A.11)
Since matrix Q is element-wise nonnegative, all matrices and vectors on the right-
hand side of the above equation are non-negative. Therefore, increasing ρ and R
element-wise can only increase the expected social welfare.
Proof of part(b) Suppose qij ∈ (q̂, 0) for some q̂ < 0. Differentiating both sides
of equation (A.11) with respect to rij, I have
dE[W ]
drij
=
1
2
σ2(qij + qji)ρiρj +O(q̂
2)
Thus, for a sufficiently small value of q̂, the derivative of E[W ] with respect to r̂
is decreasing and hence the result follows for agents’ signal commonalities. For the
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comparative statics of social welfare with respect to accuracy, I differentiate both
sides of equation (A.11) with respect to ρi. I have
dE[W ]
dρi
= σ2ρi +O(q̂)
I see that for a sufficiently small value of q̂, the derivative of E[W ] with respect to ρi
is increasing and hence the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
Proof of part (a) Recall from the proof of Proposition 1.5 that when the economy
is efficient under all information structures, expected social welfare in equilibrium is
given by equation (A.10). Therefore, in the special case that the information structure
is symmetric (i.e, when ρi = ρ̂ for all i and rij = r̂ for all distinct pairs of agents i
and j),
E[W ] =
1
2
σ2ρ̂21′(I− r̂Q)−11. (A.12)
By Assumption 1.2, I−Q  0. Therefore, I − r̂Q = (1 − r̂)I + r̂(I−Q)  0. It
is then immediate that the right-hand side of (A.12) is increasing in the accuracy
parameter ρ̂.
Proof of part (b) Recall that when the information structure is symmetric, equi-
librium social welfare is given by equation (A.12). Differentiating this expression with
respect to r̂ implies that
1
σ2ρ̂2
dE[W ]
dr̂
=
1
2
1′(I− r̂Q)−1Q(I− r̂Q)−11. (A.13)
Taking a second derivate, I obtain
1
σ2ρ̂2
d2E[W ]
dr̂2
= z′(I− r̂Q)−1z, (A.14)
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where, utilizing the fact that Q = Q∗ is symmetric, the vector z is given by z =
Q(I − r̂Q)−11. Since I − r̂Q is positive definite, it then follows that the right-hand
side of (A.14) is always positive. This means that the expression on the right-hand
side of (A.13) is increasing in r̂. Setting r̂ = 0, I have,
1
σ2ρ̂2
dE[W ]
dr̂
≥ 1
2
1′Q1.
Thus, if the right-hand side of the above inequality is positive, expected social welfare
is increasing in the commonality parameter r̂.
Proof of part (c) In the previous part, I established that the right-hand side of
(A.13) is increasing in r̂. Setting r̂ = 1, I have,
1
σ2ρ̂2
dE[W ]
dr̂
≤ 1
2
1′(I−Q)−1Q(I−Q)−11 = 1
2
b′Qb.
Therefore, if the right-hand side of the above inequality is negative, then expected
social welfare is decreasing in r̂.
Proof of part (d) Finally, suppose
b′Qb > 0 > 1′Q1.
Coupled with equation (A.13) this implies that
dE[W ]
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=1
> 0 >
dE[W ]
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=0
.
This immediately guarantees that the social welfare is non-monotone in r̂. In partic-
ular, it is first decreasing and then increasing in r̂.
Proof of Proposition 1.7
Recall that the ex ante equilbrium social welfare is given by equation (A.9), which
can be rewritten as
E[W ] =
1
2
σ2ρ′(I−Q ◦R)−1ρ+ 1
2
σ2α′((Q∗ −Q) ◦R)α. (A.15)
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The first term above is mathematically identical to the right hand side of equation
(A.10). Thus, from the argument presented in the proof of Proposition 1.5, it is easy
to see that the first term is increasing with respect to rij for all i 6= j and ρi for all i.
Consider the second term. Recall that Corollary 1.3 implies that when Q ≥ 0
element-wise, α is increasing in rij for all i 6= j and ρi for all i. Thus, when Q∗ ≥ Q ≥
0 element-wise, the second term is a matrix product of positive increasing functions
and hence is always increasing in rij for all i 6= j and ρi for all i. Consequently, the
ex ante equilibrium welfare is increasing in rij for all i 6= j and ρi for all i. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.8
Proof of part (a) Recall that the ex ante equilbrium social welfare E[W ] is given
by equation (A.9). A first order Taylor series expansion of E[W ] around r̂ = 1 is
given by
E[W ] = E[W ]|r̂=1 +
dE[W ]
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=1
(r̂ − 1) +O
(
(r̂ − 1)2
)
Thus, the behavior of the ex ante equilibrium social welfare with respect to r̂ in a
neighborhood of 1 is dictated by the derivative dE[W ]/dr̂|r̂=1 which is given by
dE[W ]
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=1
= σ2
(
dα
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=1
)′
ρ− σ2
(
dα
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=1
)′
(I−Q∗) α|r̂=1 +
1
2
σ2 α′Q∗α|r̂=1
= σ2
(
dα
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=1
)′
(Q∗ −Q) α|r̂=1 +
1
2
σ2 α′Q∗α|r̂=1 (A.16)
where I use the fact that ρ = (I − Q) α|r̂=1 from Proposition 1.1. Note that when
Q ≥ 0 element-wise, α|r̂=1 = ρ̂b ≥ 0 and dα/dr̂|r̂=1 = (I − Q)−1Qb ≥ 0 element-
wise. If Q∗ ≤ 0 element-wise, then clearly the right hand side of equation (A.16) is
non-positive. This implies that in neighborhood around r̂ = 1, the equilibrium ex
ante social welfare is decreasing in r̂.
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Proof of part (b) Suppose q < qij ≤ 0 for all i 6= j. From equation (A.2), one can
readily see that α = ρ + O(q). Thus, for a value of q sufficiently close to 0, αi ≥ 0
for all i. Further, suppose qij < q
∗
ij < 0 for all i 6= j. Under these values of Q and
Q∗, it is easy to see α|r̂=1 = ρ̂b ≥ 0, dα/dr̂|r̂=1 = (I−Q)−1Qb ≤ 0 and Q∗ −Q ≥ 0
element-wise. Consequently, the right hand side of equation (A.16) is non-positive.
Thus, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.9
Proof of part (a) Recall that the ex ante equilbrium social welfare E[W ] is given
by equation (A.9). A first order Taylor series expansion of E[W ] around r̂ = 0 is
given by
E[W ] = E[W ]|r̂=0 +
dE[W ]
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=0
r̂ +O
(
r̂2
)
Thus, the behavior of the ex ante equilibrium social welfare with respect to r̂ in a
neighborhood of 1 is dictated by the derivative dE[W ]/dr̂|r̂=0 which is given by
dE[W ]
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=0
= σ2
(
dα
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=0
)′
ρ− σ2
(
dα
dr̂
∣∣∣∣
r̂=0
)′
α|r̂=0 +
1
2
σ2 α′Q∗α|r̂=0
=
1
2
σ2ρ̂21′Q∗1 (A.17)
where I use the fact that α|r̂=0 = ρ̂1 from Proposition 1.1. Thus, the result in part
(a) follows.
Proof of part (b) The proof of part (b) follows directly from equation (A.16).
When the economy is efficient under complete information, I must have α|r̂=1 =
α∗|r̂=1 = b. Therefore, I have (Q∗ − Q) α|r̂=1 = (I − Q) α|r̂=1 − (I − Q∗) α∗|r̂=1 =
0, where the final equality follows from Propositions 1.1 and 1.2. Thus, when the
economy is efficient under complete information, dE[W ]/dr̂|r̂=1 =
1
2
σ2ρ̂2
∑
i,j q
∗
ijbibj.
This completes the proof of part (b).
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Proof of part (a) Recall that the ex ante equilibrium social welfare is given by
equation (A.15). For convenience, suppose
∑
j 6=i qij = q̂ for all i. Then, from Proposi-
tion 1.1, it is straightforward that α = ρ̂
1−q̂r̂1. Using that the fact that the economy is
regular and the information structure is symmetric, equation (A.15) can be simplified
to
E[W ] =
n
2
σ2ρ̂2
 1
1− r̂q̂
+
(∑
i,j q
∗
ij −
∑
i,j qij
)
r̂
(1− r̂q̂)2
 (A.18)
When q̂ > 0 (or equivalently
∑
i,j qij = nq̂ > 0), the first term in equation (A.18) is
increasing in r̂. Further, when
∑
i,j q
∗
ij >
∑
i,j qij, the second term is also increasing
in r̂. Thus, when
∑
i,j q
∗
ij >
∑
i,j qij > 0, both terms are increasing in r̂ and thus, the
social welfare is increasing in r̂. This concludes the proof of part (a).
Proof of part (b) Note that the ex ante equilibrium social welfare in a regular
economy is given by equation (A.18). Suppose, q̂ < 0 (or equivalently
∑
i,j qij =
nq̂ < 0). Then the first term in equation (A.18) is decreasing in r̂. Consider the
function h(r̂) = r̂
(1−r̂q̂)2 which is proportional to the second term in equation (A.18).
I have dh(r̂)/dr̂ = 1+q̂r̂
(1−r̂q̂)2 . Therefore, dh(r̂)/dr̂ > 0 for all r̂ if and only if q̂ > −1
(where I utilize the fact that q̂ < 0). If I suppose that
∑
i,j q
∗
ij <
∑
i,j qij and∑
i,j qij = nq̂ > −n, then both terms in equation (A.18) are decreasing in r̂ and thus,
the social welfare is decreasing in r̂. This concludes the proof of part (b).
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